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


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
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
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# THE NAVY

Vol. VII

WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL, 1913

No. 4

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Vol. VII

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No. 4

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At 4 o'clock on Tuesday, March 25, Philip Andrews was Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, having been appointed to that office by the President of the United States "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," under a provision of the law which conferred upon the chief of this bureau the rank of Rear Admiral in the navy and imposed upon him certain duties. At 5 o'clock on the same day Philip Andrews was a Commander in the navy. At 4 o'clock, and equally so at 5 o'clock, Philip Andrews was one of the best all-round men in the navy, an officer of great ability, of untarnished honor, and with a high sense of duty. He will do well, with all his might, whatever he is given to do.

His successor, Commander Victor Blue, is another of the good men of the navy, and Secretary Daniels is to be congratulated in having selected so competent an assistant.

There has been some criticism of the policy of appointing Commanders as Chiefs of the Bureau of Navigation, on the ground that an officer of a lower grade should not be permitted to detail for duty officers superior to him in rank. These critics forget that the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation is a statutory officer with the rank of Rear Admiral. And, as a matter of fact, in the orderly conduct of the Navy Department, the question of the detail of officers for important command always has and always will be subject to consultation between the head of the Department,—the Secretary,—the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and the Secretary's

## THE NAVAL APPROPRIATION ACT

An analysis of the naval appropriations contained in the act passed March 3, 1913, printed on another page, shows that the large amounts appropriated therein for "Increase of the Navy" for the year 1913-14 were due not to an actual increase of new work authorized by the third session of the 62d Congress, but to amounts to be applied to the construction of work authorized by previous sessions of that Congress and by former Congresses, in order that the Department might continue the work heretofore authorized. Unquestionably, the citizens of the United States supposed, when their Congressional representatives appropriated 123 millions of dollars for the naval program of 1912-13, on August 22, 1912, that that appropriation contained amounts sufficient not only to continue work already laid down, but also to allow work to be begun on all of the new naval increase. Such was not the case.

In so far as the latest bill corrects the dereliction of previous sessions, it is to be commended; but the necessity for curtailing the existing imperative demand for additional capital ships, in order to keep the naval appropriations within reasonable limits, reflects the culpable negligence of former congressional action. Especially is this delinquency shown in the Naval Appropriation Bill passed August 22, 1912, wherein was contained the authorization for the Pennsylvania and smaller vessels of the 1912-13 program. Sufficient funds should have accompanied any authorization of naval increase to ensure the construction of that increase without unduly mortgaging future appropriations. Congress in the past has exhibited a remarkable degree of moral cowardice in the passing on of present liability to be liquidated by succeeding Congresses, to the detriment of general naval increase in future years.

The cumulative result of this negligence is exhibited in the jump in the item for "Increase of the Navy" of almost fifteen millions of dollars at the same time that



the actual increase of building authorized is smaller than for several years. Here is a condition of affairs fraught with danger. The future should not be made to bear the burdens of the present: the present should guard the future from possible dangers. It is incomprehensible why a Congress should shirk actual present necessities which have been brought to its knowledge in no uncertain tones, and complacently pass on to its successor problems whose solution should be worked out to-day.

### THE PERSONNEL BILL AND ENLISTED MEN

The failure of the last session of Congress to pass the sorely-needed personnel legislation is a source of regret to all who have the good of the naval service at heart. Under present circumstances, it will be at least a year before any relief can be obtained from the conditions that have been so pointedly brought to the notice of the Congress during the last two years.

One regrettable feature in connection with the present bill is the serious misunderstanding that exists among the petty and warrant officers of the service as to the effect its provisions will have on their chances of advancement to the line. It seems to be the common belief among enlisted men that the bill prohibits ordinary seamen from receiving commissions. Such is not the case. The enlisted man is eligible to a commission under the old law of 1903, which gives an opportunity to twelve warrant officers to be commissioned ensigns, and the pending Personnel Bill in no way abridges that privilege.

In fact, as pointed out by Commander Belknap in his letter to the Navy League, published in the march number of *THE NAVY*, there are more commissions open to the warrant officers than there have ever been applicants. The highest number of applicants for examination in any year has been eleven, and on an average only half of the applicants pass the examination.

*THE NAVY* is heartily in favor of the promotion of the enlisted man to the line, when he proves worthy of the promotion. But when, out of a total enlisted personnel of over fifty thousand, less than twelve men present themselves to take the examination for ensigns, the conclusion is inevitable that there exists a condition of apathy

among the rank and file. If there was a waiting list of successful applicants from among the enlisted men, or if a large number seemed desirous of proving themselves capable of incurring the increased responsibilities of a commissioned officer by applying for examination, the claim that the enlisted men were being discriminated against might be considered a fair one.

The law permitting the commissioning of warrant officers as ensigns reads as follows:—

Hereafter in each calendar year there may, under the restrictions imposed by existing law, be appointed from the boatswains, gunners, and warrant machinists of the Navy twelve ensigns.—Act of March 3, 1903.

That subject to the restrictions imposed by existing law, boatswains, gunners, and warrant machinists shall be eligible for appointment to the grade of ensign after four years' service as warrant officers, and boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sailmakers shall be eligible for appointment as chief boatswains, chief gunners, chief carpenters, and chief sailmakers after six years from date of warrant.—Act of April 27, 1904.

### CONGRESS AND THE NAVY

Colonel Robert M. Thompson's Letter to the Editor (printed in this number of *THE NAVY*), written when the last session of the Sixty-second Congress had determined that the United States should retire to a still lower rank among the naval powers of the world, contains many kernels of vital truth that should be assimilated by the American public. Not only is money thrown away when it is appropriated for the building of an inadequate navy, but the building of such a navy lulls the people into a mistaken feeling of security, the awakening from which might prove extremely exasperating.

*THE NAVY* cannot, however, follow its correspondent to his last conclusion,—that Congress might still further economize and cease to appropriate for any battleships, in order to arouse a popular demand for the country's protection. The time is coming when, without resorting to such extreme measures, the citizens of the United States will demand full protection by the least expensive method,—viz., that of an adequate navy,—and without depending on the goodwill of any European nation, however friendly. The United States is rich enough; its citizens are patriotic enough to avoid the weakness of a foreign nation.



## AN ANGLO-AMERICAN CANAL

In "The Outlook" for March 8 is an article by Judge Samuel Seabury on The Panama Canal: Shall It Be American or Anglo-American? Anyone interested in the subject of Panama Canal tolls should read it, no matter which side of the controversy they take. Judge Seabury shows that, from his point of view, Congress had the right to exempt American coastwise vessels from tolls; that it is a question coming within the exceptions specified in the Arbitration Treaty of 1908; that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty is now voidable and that our government should declare it void.

The diplomatic history leading up to the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty and the changed conditions due to the acquisition of sovereignty over the strip secured by the United States are clearly set forth; but the most important part of his article is the position he takes toward that treaty and the reasons he gives why the government of the United States should declare it void.

In speaking of the British Protest, he says:—

The importance of the Protest consists, not in the fact that it relates to tolls, but in the fact that it carries with it the assertion that the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty exists with the same force and effect to-day that it possessed before the United States became the sovereign over the territory through which the Canal is being constructed. If this claim be admitted, and the words "all nations" as used in subdivision 1 of Article Three of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty are to be regarded as including the United States, then the following consequences result:

The United States must impose the same rate of tolls upon its merchant ships, war-ships, or Government vessels that it does upon those of foreign nations; it can never blockade the Canal or exercise any right of war in it, even if it is itself a belligerent, and the representatives of the United States at Panama must open the locks and escort a hostile fleet through the Canal; if the United States becomes a belligerent it shall not revictual or take stores in the Canal, except when strictly necessary; it shall not embark or disembark troops or munitions of war in the Canal territory, and its own war vessels shall not remain in the waters adjacent to the Canal within the three-mile limit for longer than twenty-four hours at any one time; and it cannot use the plant and surroundings of the Canal for any hostile purpose.

In short, if the United States should become a belligerent it could not use its own Canal for naval and military purposes, and

the Canal would be of no more strategic value to it than it would be to its enemy.

Judge Seabury's thought would seem clearly enough expressed in the above quotations; but, unfortunately, they are clouded by a note by the Editors of "The Outlook":—

Judge Seabury is, of course, stating these conclusions as a *reductio ad absurdum*. The reply to this argument made by those who advocate the maintenance of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, is that, in time of war, all treaties will be abrogated; but the whole trend of Judge Seabury's argument is that the treaty *was* abrogated when the United States acquired the Canal territory.—The Editors.

This note does not seem to deal directly with Judge Seabury's article. He endeavors to show that the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty is voidable, not now void; and, further, that the United States should at once abrogate the Treaty, by declaring it void because of changed conditions. Judge Seabury, of course, knew that "in time of war all treaties will be abrogated" between the belligerents (and even to this statement he would probably have a few exceptions); but he was considering the possible action of Great Britain under the Treaty, not in the "unthinkable case" of war with Great Britain, but of war with some other nation, possibly an ally of hers. Here is the gravamen of Judge Seabury's article. If his contention is right, the Canal does become to some extent Anglo-American as long as the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty is maintained, and in case of war the strip cannot be used as our own, but must be regarded as neutral because of this Anglican compact. He holds that the question of tolls comes within the exceptions in the Arbitration Treaty of 1908, because if the words "All nations" should be decided against us, the vital interests of the United States would be seriously affected and we would be found to have entered into an entangling alliance with all the burdens and none of the benefits.

He further states:—

The British Protest makes no renunciation of rights under the Treaty. It does, however, recognize that, as a result of events subsequent to the treaty, the United States has "become the practical sovereign of the Canal," and that all the provisions of the treaty are not to be deemed of the same force that they possessed when the treaty was concluded.



Now, here would seem to be common ground for a settlement of the Protest. The United States cannot arbitrate the question of tolls, so long as the effect of the Treaty is in doubt, for the claim upon which the Protest is based appears to affect the vital interests of the United States; but it might be possible to procure from Great Britain such a declaration of her construction of the present effect of the Treaty as to remove all objections to arbitrating the question of tolls. Should such a declaration be refused, it would be patent to all that the question of refunding the tolls to our coastwise commerce was not the moving interest in the Protest and it would then be necessary to abrogate the Treaty upon which the Protest depends for its argument.

Judge Seabury has given us a scholarly and lucid argument, and he would deal with the case in a purely judicial manner, so strongly urged by many peace advocates. Captain Mahan, in "Armaments and Arbitration," shows the danger of too closely following the law in international affairs, and this case seems one for diplomacy rather than for strict adherence to the letter of the law.

*Richard Wainwright,  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired.*

### "MILITARY MEN"

The so-called "*Independent*" of February 27 has a semi-satirical editorial called "Hobson's Council of National Defense," the writer of which criticises the Secretary of the Navy League for claiming that but four out of the sixteen members of the proposed Council are military men. The editorial in question classes the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, the chairman of the Senate committees on Military Affairs and Naval Affairs, and the chairmen of the House Committees on Military Affairs and Naval Affairs as military men. The statement in so far as it concerns the Secretaries and chairmen mentioned exhibits either gross ignorance or intentional prevarication, which is designed to deceive the unthinking citizen. The only military men which the Bill for a Council of National Defense proposed to place on the Council were the chief of the General Staff of the Army, an officer of the

navy not below the rank of Captain, the President of the Army War College, and the President of the Naval War College.

The "*Independent*," if true to its name, should be above such absurd quibbling; but since—as we learn from the report of Edwin D. Mead, a trustee of the World's Peace Foundation—"Mr. Holt serves as one of our paid lecturers, having during the year given ten lectures for us in colleges and universities, . . . while the '*Independent*,' which has now come entirely into his hands, has long been the best weekly organ of our cause in the country," the "*Independent*" has evidently ceased to be independent.

Furthermore, readers of the "*Independent*" should be aware of the fact that articles advocating the disarmament of the United States, which may be published under the signatures of either David Starr Jordan, James A. MacDonald, or Edwin D. Mead are written by men who are the *paid* employees of the World Peace Foundation.

In this number of *THE NAVY*, ex-Secretary Meyer traces the development of his plan of naval organization during his term of office in an article entitled, "The Navy Department." Especial emphasis is laid by Mr. Meyer on the necessity of Aids to the Secretary; this is without doubt the most important change introduced by the retiring Secretary.

Rear Admiral Kimball, in his speech, "The Abolition of the Navy," sketches the probable results of some of the claims of the Peace Societies and the absurd conclusions following therefrom.

The need of a strong navy is logically presented by Rear Admiral Stockton, in "A Strong Navy Essential to the United States," in which he carefully analyzes the claims of the Peace Societies and the results to which they lead, and at the same time presents irrefutably the necessity of the United States having a navy powerful enough to protect its cities, coasts, and dependencies from the attack of foreign nations, singly or combined.

The World's progress in naval development is tabulated in "Capital ships of 1912," wherein is shown the battleships laid down and launched and the official trials of those completed in 1912.



## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

## APPROPRIATIONS FOR BATTLESHIPS

To the Editor of THE NAVY:

Apparently the controlling element in the House of Representatives has decided to limit appropriations hereafter to one battleship a year. If this be true, it will be a matter of only a few years until we have fallen into fifth place in naval power. Every dollar that Congress appropriates for the Navy under these circumstances is money thrown away.

Our present Navy is amply large to protect the Pacific, but it would be only a trap in case we were forced into war with one of the strong European military nations with marked superiority on the sea.

The country would take it for granted that Congress had provided a Navy sufficiently strong to protect our coasts, and in case of a dispute or misunderstanding the people might easily become inflamed and force the Government into a war for which we were totally unprepared.

If Congress has made up its mind that it will not provide a sufficient Navy, then why not economize still more by not providing for any new battleships at all and instead build the necessary auxiliaries for such Navy as we have? Such action would bring the question squarely before the people of the country, and they can decide for themselves whether they are content to go without the protection of a Navy, and trust our coasts to the protection of England, in case we should become involved in war, for instance with Germany.

ROBERT M. THOMPSON.

## A COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

ASSEMBLY CHAMBER,  
STATE OF NEW YORK.

To the Editor of THE NAVY:

Please find enclosed certified copy of Concurrent Resolution passed by the Legislature, approving the bill now before Congress establishing a Council of National Defense. There is no question but that this act should become a law, as all first-class Powers have a Council of National Defense, or a Council of War, whereby the governmental departments that are concerned in the defense of the country can have a thorough understanding as to the cost, efficiency, and preparedness of the National defense.

LOUIS A. CUVILLIER.

## Concurrent Resolution.

Whereas, There is pending in Congress a bill to establish a Council of National Defense, to be composed of the President, Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the Chairman of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs, and Naval Affairs, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and the Presidents of the Army and Navy War Colleges;

Whereas, Said bill is patriotic in its purpose and entails no expense to the national government, and is for the purpose of a council of defense of the nation;

Resolved (if the Senate concur), That the Legislature of the State of New York approves of said bill and respectfully re-

quests the representatives in Congress of the State of New York to use their best offices in its behalf.

[The above Resolution was passed by the Assembly on February 3, 1913, and sent to the Senate for concurrence, and, on February 19, it was returned with a message that the Senate had concurred in the passage of the same without amendment.]

## "ERRORS OF A PEACE ADVOCATE"

To the Editor of THE NAVY:

In the dispatches of the Associated Press, I find quoted, from your issue of February 18, an article entitled, "The Errors of a Peace Advocate." In this article, Rear Admiral Richard Wainwright, U.S.N., retired, makes certain strictures on the efforts of workers for peace and especially on a note of mine in the Atlantic Monthly for January, entitled "Popularizing the Navy."

The note in question was hardly intended to furnish absolute statistics. It is, however, to my regret, open to a certain criticism, not as exaggerated, but as being so briefly or so loosely stated as to leave its application obscure.

The last census is quoted as giving \$528 as the average wage per year of the American workman. The wages of 20,000 men for a year would hardly pay for the battleship *North Dakota*. As to the *net savings* (inexactly called "earnings") of the people of North Dakota, there are naturally no exact statistics; 100,000 wage earners at \$120 per year would count up \$12,000,000. Again, in referring to "the whole," I had in mind the naval plant in its entirety, not merely the ships in the local review. In the last two administrations, both of them marked by lavish military expenditure, about \$1,300,000,000 has been spent on the navy. How much of this should be deducted for current expenses and how much should be added as representing the plant existing in 1901, I have no means of estimating.

But these figures have no permanent importance. My sole purpose was to call attention to the unprecedented sums now assigned to the navy. If \$146,000,000 is required in 1913, while \$55,953,000 was apparently generously adequate in 1901, there should be some strong justification for the increase. Such justification does not, it seems to me, appear in the article of Admiral Wainwright, nor in any of the "Sixty-seven Reasons for a Strong Navy," recently sent out by the Navy League.

But having elsewhere ventured to review critically the Navy League Circular, I will not attempt to discuss here any of the other points in Admiral Wainwright's rejoinder.

DAVID STARR JORDAN.

To the Editor of THE NAVY:

Through your courtesy, I have seen Dr. Jordan's letter to THE NAVY. All I attempted to show was that his statements contained many errors. He admits some of his errors; but appears to have less regard for accuracy than I think to be right. I believe that even a paid advocate of peace should endeavor to ascertain the truth when framing his arguments against armaments.

RICHARD WAINWRIGHT,  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired.



## NOTE AND COMMENT

KING GEORGE of Greece was assassinated while walking in the streets of Salonica, at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of March 18. His assailant is probably an insane socialist. King George was sixty-eight years of age, and had ruled Greece for almost fifty years. He will be succeeded by his son, Constantine.

The killing of the King of Greece has no political significance, and will in no way alter the present situation in the Balkans, as his son Constantine has been in accord with the program pursued by his father.

His death will bring mourning into many of the courts of Europe. He was the brother of the Dowager Queen of England and of the Dowager Empress of Russia, an uncle of the King of Norway, of the Czar of Russia, of the Sovereign Grand Duchess of Mecklenburgh-Schwerein, and of the present King of Denmark.

DURING the past month the principal accomplishment of the allies has been the capture of the Turkish city of Janina and the surrender of 32,000 Turkish troops. Scutari and Adrianople are still holding out, but their surrender is expected daily. The commander at Adrianople is said to have offered to give up the town if his troops were allowed the honors of war. This condition was refused by the allies.

Turkey has placed herself in the hands of the powers, asking for the best peace terms obtainable. The hitch in negotiations is over the payment of a war indemnity and the final disposition of the Aegean Islands, the allies claiming that all islands in the Aegean should pass into possession of Greece and that an indemnity (stated to be \$200,000,000) should be paid by Turkey.

Bulgarian activity has apparently ceased around Constantinople, awaiting, perhaps, the surrender of Adrianople and the result of the latest demands.

The Turkish cruiser *Hamidieh* has been active, sinking a number of Grecian transports engaged in moving troops to reinforce the Montenegrin forces besieging Scutari.

The difficulty of securing reliable information concerning happenings at the seat of the Balkan war was shown by the reports published in the March number of THE NAVY. In the note on that war, it was stated that Enver Bey, the Turkish statesman, had been assassinated; but he has since shown himself very much alive. Furthermore, the report that the Bulgarians had captured the Bulair forts in the peninsula of Gallipoli was erroneous.

THE Mexican Congress has acquiesced in the victory won by Huerta and Felix Diaz and has formally recognized General Huerta as Provisional President of Mexico.

This recognition was followed by action so energetic in character that it scarce escapes the characterization of "military despotism." The Mexican capital has been either cowed into a stolid acceptance of accomplished facts or terrorized beyond protesting against the acts of the Military Dictator.

But the City of Mexico does not constitute, as many Mexican Presidents have discovered to their sorrow, the Mexican nation. The opposition to Huerta and his colleague, Felix Diaz, is as pronounced at present in the northern states of the Mexican Republic as it ever was against the rule of Madero. Especially is this true of the states of Sonora and Coahuila. The Governor of Coahuila has issued a statement, repudiating the Huerta government and declaring that any compromise is impossible. Huerta seems, however, to have made some sort of a compromise with the followers of Gomez and Zapata in the south.

While affairs on the surface are calmer, on March 19 the cruiser *California*, with 400,000 rounds of rifle ammunition and camping outfits for shore duty, sailed from San Francisco for Mexican waters. She is scheduled to meet the *Maryland* at San Diego, from which place the two vessels will proceed to Guaymas, where the flag of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet will be transferred from the *Colorado* to the *California*.

A question pertinent to the success of the Huerta revolution in Mexico is the question of the recognition of the new Provisional Government. This *de facto* government has already been recognized by the same congress that till the success of Huerta had been giving its allegiance to Madero.

The deposition of American troops within easy striking distances of the border shows that the situation is being carefully watched by the new administration.

Especially true in revolutionary affairs is the adage that "Nothing succeeds like success"; but the assassination of his leading opponents, following the coming to power of Huerta, naturally casts a shadow on his path, and until that is cleared away deliberation ought to mark any steps taken by the American Government. The hesitation of the United States to recognize the Chinese Republic ought surely to furnish a precedent for delay in Mexican affairs.

The Wilson Administration must meet this problem, and it is not a question to be dealt with lightly.





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PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON  
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy





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SECRETARY JOSEPHUS DANIELS

SECRETARY DANIELS has evidently the right ideas concerning the methods to be pursued in order to acquire the knowledge necessary to a competent official. In response to a request for a "Fore-word" on his proposed naval policies, the Secretary writes to THE NAVY:—

As regards your request for a "Fore-Word" from me touching on anticipated naval developments, I can only say that I am not yet well enough equipped to give you any statement based on my own observations, and I feel that any other kind of statement would be of little value to you. I can say this, however: that I intend to study every detail of the navy, its organization, and its requirements, and my mind is open to suggestion from all capable sources. I will visit the navy yards and stations and also the ships of the fleet as soon as I have an opportunity. It will take me some time to get hold of all the details of a big Department like this, and I shall not be prepared to issue any general statements of policy until I have mastered the details.

This much, however, the Secretary has decided: It is to be the policy that an officer of the rank of commander shall not have the assignment of rear admirals and captains, who are senior to him, and Secretary Daniels has issued instructions that he himself will handle the assignments to duty of these two grades after hearing the recommendations by his full Council of Aids.

SECRETARY DANIELS has revoked one of the last orders of the late Secretary Meyer. This order relates to the sale of a section of land adjoining the naval hospital grounds at Chelsea, Mass. Naval Medical officers of the hospital filed a protest against the sale, maintaining that the area referred to might become covered with factories that might be detrimental to the hospital.

WHEN the water was pumped out of the cofferdam enclosing the dry dock at Pearl Harbor, the outside pressure caused the bottom of the dock to rise. Knowledge of what the actual damage is and how far it will be necessary to rebuild the dock is not available at present. All that is known comes from unofficial sources.

SECRETARY MEYER, before retiring from office, signed the order placing the Mare Island yard in the second class. This yard is available only for vessels drawing less than twenty-four feet. The suggestion by the General Board that the approaches to the yard be dredged to a depth of forty feet will not be entertained. Army engineers, however, will continue the improvement of the part of the channel having a commercial value. The necessary dredging is estimated to cost at least \$10,000 per year.

A new navy yard on the Pacific Coast for ships has been a necessity for many years, but its establishment has been prevented by the influence which had for its object the making of the Mare Island yard a first-class naval repair yard.

ALTHOUGH the establishment of new coaling depots is stopped by a clause in the last Appropriation Bill, the improvement of existing plants is not interfered with, as there is an appropriation of \$62,000 for repairs and additions to existing plants.

Congress seems inclined to limit the authority of the Department to equip new naval depots without specific



Congressional sanction. At the same time, the authorized items are not to be considered niggardly when the following are taken into account: \$306,350 for coaling plant and \$30,000 for additional fuel tanks at Pearl Harbor; \$57,700 for fuel tank at Boston, \$43,500 for heater coils in fuel tanks; and a contingent fund of \$62,550.

THE announcement by President Wilson that his administration would not request the American bankers heretofore interested in the proposed six-power loan to China to continue to seek their share of the loan, has resulted in the withdrawal of these bankers from seeking any participation in that loan. President Wilson's action reverses the policy of the Taft Administration and came as a surprise to the American bankers and their foreign associates. Only the day before the President's announcement, Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, in answer to a question in the House of Commons, had stated that the loan had the unanimous approval of the six powers interested. The world-wide comment on the President's action, in official and diplomatic quarters, indicates the importance attached to the reversal of the American policy.

SINCE President Wilson's repudiation of the preceding administration's policy regarding the Chinese loan, the question of the recognition of the newly established Chinese government has come to the front and serious consideration is being given to the subject.

Official recognition of the Chinese Republic is largely sentimental, as the United States has dealt with Yuan Shi-Kai's regime as the *de facto* government of China, ever since the Manchus abandoned Peking. The Chinese Minister in Washington and the American Minister in Peking have possessed all the influence that they would have had, had recognition been given.

But sentiment plays an important part in the affairs of nations as well as of individuals. China is being pressed by her creditors and would undoubtedly be in a better position to carry on her loan negotiations if the United States should grant official approval of the new government. Not only would such action increase the friendship that exists between the two nations, but would redound to the commercial benefit of both China and the United States.

THE orderly and well-managed way in which the Chinese elections have been conducted must have surprised those critics who have so often said that the Chinese are utterly unfit for self-government. So far as ascertainable, the elections have been not only a credit to the Chinese people, but might well serve as models to the majority of our excitable neighbors of Latin America. It is even doubtful if the elections in our own country, immediately following the end of the War of the Revolution, were freer from graft and turbulence than those just concluded in China.

The lower house of the national assembly and the provincial assemblies are elected by popular vote, and the provincial assemblies elect the members of the upper house of the National Congress. The National Congress is due to be opened early in April, when the manner of electing a President of China will be decided upon.

THE classification of "cruisers" has been altered. The old names of "armored cruiser," "first class protected cruiser," "second class protected cruiser," "third class protected cruiser," "unarmored cruiser," and "scout" have been abolished. Under the new system, "battle cruisers" will be named as before. The old "armored cruisers" and "first class protected cruisers" will be known as "cruisers." All the remaining vessels, which approximately means anything under 5,500 tons, will be known as "light cruisers." The new arrangement makes greatly for simplicity. It is not altogether absolutely original, as something of the sort has obtained in Germany for some time. It is objected to because by means of it it will be easy to show a preponderance of British cruisers than has hitherto been possible. It is also pointed out that an armored cruiser like the *Minotaur* which could probably successfully engage many of the pre-Dreadnought battleships, is classed with twenty-year old cruisers like the *Edgars*, which merely carry a couple of obsolete 9.2 inch guns and ten old 6-inch guns. Similarly, the cruisers of the "Town" class, with nine 6-inch guns are rated with old scouts that carry nothing but 12-pounders (the promised re-armament of these has not yet taken place, and does not seem likely to).

Apart from these discrepancies, which are bound to exist in any classification whatever, the change seems one of decided advantage on account of its increased simplicity.





U.S.S. WYOMING  
Flagship of the Atlantic Fleet





REAR ADMIRAL CHARLES E. CLARK, U.S.N., RETIRED

## NAVAL REMINISCENCES

## IV

## THE FIRST SHELL

Rear Admiral Charles E. Clark, who was the commander of the *Oregon* when she made her phenomenal run from the Pacific Coast to Cuba during the Spanish-American War, refused to tell for publication any of the history-making incidents in which he has taken part. Finally, he was asked for his first experience under fire, and told the following story.

I was on the sloop-of-war *Ossipee*. A blockade runner had been run ashore on the beach near Fort Morgan, and we were sent in by Admiral Farragut to shell her and insure her destruction.

I noticed a puff of smoke on the parapet of the fort, and then heard a peculiar whistling noise in the air directly over my head. The first time one hears this noise, one recognizes that it is a shell, just as one knows the sound made by a rattlesnake the first time one hears it.

I was so sure the shell was coming straight at me that, before I was conscious of what I was doing, I bent down to avoid it, just as a boy stoops to avoid a snowball.

Then I realized what I had done, and, being a youngster and a little ashamed of it, I took a furtive glance aft to see if the captain or anyone else had noticed me. I discovered that the captain, Commander Le Roy, was walking around at the other end of the ship, in a stooping posture. Naturally I thought more people would be watching him than me. As he straightened up, I heard him say to his first lieutenant:—

“By Jove, Howell! that was a fearfully close shave! That confounded thing only went about a foot clear of our heads.”

While I was puzzling myself as to whether there had been two shells at the same time (for I was on the fore-castle and knew that I had heard one pass close over my head), the matter was cleared up. An Irishman at one of the broadside guns nearly midway between us called excitedly to his shipmates:—

“Be gorrry, byes, I could’ve caught it in me hat!”

*C. E. Clark*

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired.



CAPITAL SHIPS OF 1912

The following tables and diagrams are taken from "The Engineer" (London)

CAPITAL SHIPS LAID DOWN IN 1912.

Name.	Builders.	Laid down.	Normal displacement.	Armament.	H.P.	Designed speed.	Machinery.	Boilers.	Builders of machinery.
			Tons.			Knots.			
BRITISH—									
Iron Duke ..	Portsmouth Yard ..	January ..	26,000	10 13.5in. A., 16 6in., 5 21in. t.t.	(?)	22	Parsons turbine	Babcock ..	Cammell, Laird
Marlborough ..	Devonport Yard ..	January ..	26,000	10 13.5in. A., 16 6in., 5 21in. t.t.	(?)	22	Parsons turbine	Yarrow ..	Hawthorn, L.
Delhi ..	Vickers ..	May ..	26,000	10 13.5in. A., 16 6in., 5 21in. t.t.	(?)	22	Parsons turbine	Yarrow ..	Vickers
Benbow ..	Beardmore ..	June ..	26,000	10 13.5in. A., 16 6in., 5 21in. t.t.	(?)	22	Parsons turbine	Babcock ..	Beardmore
Tiger ..	Clydebank ..	June ..	29,000	8 13.5in. A., 16 6in., 5 21in. t.t.	100,000	31	Parsons turbine	Babcock ..	Clydebank
Queen Elizabeth	Portsmouth Yard ..	November ..	28,000*	8 15in. (?), 6in. (?) t.t.	(?)	25	Parsons turbine	Babcock ..	(?)
Warspite ..	Devonport Yard ..	November ..	28,000*	8 15in. (?), 6in. (?) t.t.	(?)	25	Parsons turbine	Yarrow ..	(?)
CHILE—									
Al Latorre ..	Elswick ..	June ..	28,000	10 14in. f 20 4.7in., 4 21in. t.t.	40,000	23	Parsons turbine	Yarrow ..	Vickers
FRENCH—									
Bretagne ..	Brest ..	July ..	23,550	10 13.4in., 22 5.5in., 4 18in. t.t.	29,000	21	Parsons turbine	Belleville ..	La Seyne
Lorraine ..	St. Nazaire ..	July ..	23,550	10 13.4in., 22 5.5in., 4 18in. t.t.	29,000	21	Parsons turbine	Niclausse ..	St. Nazaire
Provence ..	Lorient ..	July ..	23,550	10 13.4in., 22 5.5in., 4 18in. t.t.	29,000	21	Parsons turbine	Guyot ..	La Seyne
GERMAN—									
E. Brandenburg	Kiel Yard ..	(1912) ..	27,000*	† 8 14in., 12 6in., 6 22in. t.t.	(?)	24	(?)	Schulz T. ..	—
E.K. Augusta	Schichau-Danzig ..	September ..	30,000*	† 8 14in., 12 6in., 6 22in. t.t.	100,000	26.5	Parsons turbine	Schulz T. ..	Schichau
ITALIAN—									
Duilio ..	Castellamare ..	April ..	21,500	13 12in., 18 6in. (?) tubes	24,000	22.5	(?) T.	Yarrow ..	Ansaldo
A. Doria ..	Spezia ..	March ..	21,500	13 12in., 18 6in. (?) tubes	24,000	22.5	(?) T.	Yarrow ..	Ansaldo
JAPANESE—									
Haruna ..	Kawasaki Co. ..	March ..	27,500	8 14in., 16 6in., 8 21in. t.t.	68,000	27	Curtis turbine	Miyabara ..	Kawasaki
Kirishima ..	Mitsu Bishi Co. ..	March ..	27,500	8 14in., 16 6in., 8 21in. t.t.	68,000	27	Parsons turbine	Miyabara ..	Mitsu Bishi
Fuso ..	Kure ..	March ..	31,300	10 14in., 16 6in. (?) t.t.	45,000	22.5	Parsons turbine	Miyabara ..	(?)
RUSSIAN—									
Ismail ..	Galerni ..	December ..	28,000	9 14in., 20 4.7in. (?) t.t.	(?)	27	(?) T.	Yarrow ..	Baltic Works
Kinburn ..	Baltic Works ..	December ..	28,000	9 14in., 20 4.7in. (?) t.t.	(?)	27	(?) T.	Yarrow ..	Baltic Works
Borodino ..	Galerni ..	December ..	28,000	9 14in., 20 4.7in. (?) t.t.	(?)	27	(?) T.	Yarrow ..	Baltic Works
No. 4 ..	Baltic Works ..	December ..	28,000	9 14in., 20 4.7in. (?) t.t.	(?)	27	—	Yarrow ..	Baltic Works
SPANISH—									
Jaime I. ..	Ferrol ..	February ..	15,700	8 12in., 20 4in., 3 18in. t.t.	15,500	19.5	Parsons turbine	Yarrow ..	Vickers, &c.
SWEDISH—									
Sverige ..	Gothenburg ..	(1912) ..	7,000	4 11in., 8 6in., 2 t.t.	20,000	22.5	(?) T.	Yarrow ..	Gota Works
U.S.A.—									
Oklahoma ..	N.Y. Shipbuilding ..	June ..	27,500	10 14in., 21 5in. (?), 21in. t.t.	35,000	20.5	Reciprocating	Babcock ..	N.Y. Shipblg.
Nevada ..	Fore River Co. ..	June ..	27,500	10 14in., 21 5in. (?), 21in. t.t.	35,000	20.5	Curtis turbine	Babcock ..	Fore River Co.

British "13.5 A" is reported to be really 14in. Fuso armament also reported as 8-15in. \* About. † Probably.

PRINCIPAL TRIALS IN 1912.


Name.	Builder.	Builders of machinery.	Boilers.	Designed for	Trial results.		
					Mean.		Maximum.
BRITISH—					30 hrs. at 1/10.	8 hrs. at full-speed.	
Orion ..	Portsmouth Yard ..	Parsons turbines by Wallsend ..	Babcock ..	27,000 = 21 knots ..	18,966 = 18.8	29,108 = 21	21.31
Thunderer ..	Thames I.W. ..	Parsons turbines by Thames I.W. ..	Babcock ..	27,000 = 21 knots ..	18,929 = 18.8	27,426 = 20.8	(?) <sup>2</sup>
Conqueror ..	Beardmore ..	Parsons turbines by Beardmore ..	Yarrow ..	27,000 = 21 knots ..	19,100 = 19.4	28,400 = 23.1	23.1 <sup>3</sup>
Monarch ..	Elswick ..	Parsons turbines by Hawthorn ..	Yarrow ..	27,000 = 21 knots ..	19,128 =	28,555 = 21.88	—
Lion ..	Devonport ..	Parsons turbines by Vickers ..	Yarrow ..	70,000 = 28 knots ..	= 24.5	= 29	31.7 <sup>4</sup>
Princess Royal	Vickers ..	Parsons turbines by Vickers ..	Yarrow ..	70,000 = 28 knots ..	—	—	32.4
Falmouth ..	Beardmore ..	Parsons turbines by Beardmore ..	Yarrow ..	—	(?) hrs. at 1/10.	Full power.	— <sup>5</sup>
Dartmouth ..	Vickers ..	Parsons turbines by Vickers ..	Yarrow ..	—	18,374 =	26,311 = 27.01	—
Weymouth ..	Elswick ..	Parsons turbines by Parsons ..	Yarrow ..	—	18,839 = 24.95	23,467 = 25.90	—
Yarmouth ..	London and G. ..	Brown Curtis turbines by London and G. ..	Yarrow ..	22,000 = 25 knots ..	18,076 =	23,532 = 25.60	—
Active ..	Pembroke ..	Parsons turbines by Hawthorn ..	Yarrow ..	18,000 = 25 knots ..	At 1/10.	24,000 = 26.00	—
Lurcher ..	Yarrow ..	Parsons turbines by Yarrow ..	Yarrow ..	Designed for 32 kts.	15,385 =	19,498 = 25.9	— <sup>7</sup>
GERMAN—							
Oldenberg ..	Schichau ..	Reciprocating by Schichau ..	S. Thornycroft ..	28,000 = 20.5 knots	(?)	(?) = 22.2	22.2 <sup>8</sup>
Goeben ..	Blohm and Voss ..	Parsons turbines by B. and Voss ..	S. Thornycroft ..	70,000 = 27 knots ..	(?)	(?) = 28.6	32 <sup>10</sup>
Magdeburg ..	Weser ..	Bergmann turbines, Weser ..	S. Thornycroft ..	30,000 = 27 knots ..	(?)	(?)	27.5 <sup>11</sup>
Breslau ..	Vulcan Co. ..	A.E.G. (Curtis) turbines by Vulcan ..	S. Thornycroft ..	30,000 = 27 knots ..	(?)	(?)	27.5 <sup>11</sup>
ITALIAN—							
D. Alighieri ..	Castellamere ..	Parsons turbines by Ansaldo ..	Blechynden ..	—	At 1/10.	21,000 = 21	35,000 = 23.6
JAPANESE—							
Umikase ..	Japan ..	Parsons turbines ..	Miyabara ..	—		= 33.46	(?) <sup>13</sup>
U.S.A.—							
Utah ..	N.Y. Yard ..	Parsons turbines by N.Y. Yard ..	Babcock ..	28,000 = 20.5 knots		= 21.92	22.07
Florida ..	N.Y. Shipbuilding ..	Parsons turbines by N.Y. Shipblg. ..	Babcock ..	28,000 = 20.5 knots		= 21.04	—
Wyoming ..	Cramp ..	Parsons turbines by Cramp ..	Babcock ..	28,000 = 20.5 knots	24 hrs.	20,784 = 19.21	31,437 = 21.22

REMARKS.  
<sup>2</sup> Did much better on later trials, but reliable data unobtainable.  
<sup>3</sup> On 6 measured mile runs the speed was practically the same each time.  
<sup>5</sup> Since reported to have reached 34.7 with new propellers.  
<sup>7</sup> Turbines of all have given more or less trouble.  
<sup>8</sup> Consumption 1.5 lb. on full power.  
<sup>10</sup> Destroyer to Special Yarrow design.  
<sup>11</sup> Best measured mile in each case.  
<sup>13</sup> Maximum speed quite unverified.  
<sup>14</sup> Both of these cruisers came well up to contract power on trial, but there is nothing to indicate that they exceeded results here given.  
<sup>15</sup> Maximum is result of best measured mile.  
<sup>16</sup> T.B.D. did not reach expectations.



CAPITAL SHIPS LAUNCHED IN 1912.


Name.	Builder.	Launched.	Normal displacement.	Armament, guns and torpedo tubes	H.P.	Speed.	Machinery.	Boilers.	Builders of machinery.
			Tons.			Knots.			
BRITISH—									
Ajax .. .. .	Scott's .. .. .	March .. .. .	25,000	10 13.5in., 20 4in., 5 21in. t.t.	31,000	21	Parsons turbine	Babcock ..	Scott's
Audacious .. .. .	Cammell, Laird .. .. .	September .. .. .	25,000	10 13.5in., 20 4in., 5 21in. t.t.	31,000	21	Parsons turbine	Yarrow ..	Cammell, Laird
Queen Mary .. .. .	Palmer .. .. .	March .. .. .	28,850	8 13.5in., 16 4in., 5 21in. t.t.	80,000	28	Parsons turbine	Yarrow ..	Clydebank
Iron Duke .. .. .	Portsmouth Yard .. .. .	October .. .. .	26,000	10 13.5in., 16 6in., 5 21in. t.t.	33,000	21	Parsons turbine	Babcock ..	—
Marlbrough .. .. .	Devonport Yard .. .. .	October .. .. .	26,000	10 13.5in., 16 6in., 5 21in. t.t.	33,000	21	Parsons turbine	Yarrow ..	Hawthorne
AUSTRIAN—									
Teggethof .. .. .	Stab. Tecnico .. .. .	March .. .. .	20,000	12 12in., 12 6in., 4 21in. t.t.	25,000	21	Parsons turbine	Yarrow ..	Stab. Tecnico
P. Eugen .. .. .	Pola .. .. .	November .. .. .	20,000	12 12in., 12 6in., 4 21in. t.t.	25,000	21	Parsons turbine	Yarrow ..	Stab. Tecnico
FRENCH—									
Paris .. .. .	La Seyne .. .. .	28 September .. .. .	23,467	12 12in., 22 5.5in., 4 18in. t.t.	28,000	21	Parsons turbine	Belleville ..	La Seyne
France .. .. .	St. Nazaire .. .. .	November .. .. .	23,467	12 12in., 22 5.5in., 4 18in. t.t.	28,000	21	Parsons turbine	Niclausse ..	St. Nazaire
GERMAN—									
K. Albert .. .. .	Schichau, Danzig .. .. .	April .. .. .	24,500	10 12.2in., 14 6in., 6 22in. t.t.	25,000	20-21	Parsons turbine	Schulz T. ..	Schichau
P.R. Luitpold .. .. .	Krupp .. .. .	February .. .. .	24,500	10 12.2in., 14 6in., 6 22in. t.t.	25,000	20-21	Parsons turbine	Schulz T. ..	Krupp
Seydlitz .. .. .	Blohm and Voss .. .. .	March .. .. .	24,000	10 12.2in., 14 6in., 6 22in. t.t.	68,000	25.5	Parsons turbine	Schulz T. ..	Blohm and Voss
JAPANESE—									
Kongo .. .. .	Vickers .. .. .	18 May .. .. .	27,500	8 14in., 16 6in., 8 t.t. ..	68,000	27	Parsons turbine	Yarrow ..	Vickers
Hi Yei .. .. .	Yokosuka .. .. .	November .. .. .	27,500	8 14in., 16 6in., 8 t.t. ..	68,000	27	Parsons turbine	Miyabara ..	—
SPANISH—									
Espana .. .. .	Ferrol .. .. .	September .. .. .	15,700	8 12in., 20 4in., 3 18in. t.t.	15,500	19.5	Parsons turbine	Yarrow ..	Vickers, &c.
U.S.A.—									
New York .. .. .	New York Yard .. .. .	October .. .. .	27,000	10 14in., 21 5in., 4 21in. t.t.	28,100	21	Reciprocating ..	Babcock ..	Cramp
Texas .. .. .	Newport News .. .. .	May .. .. .	27,000	10 14in., 21 5in., 4 21in. t.t.	28,100	21	Reciprocating ..	Babcock ..	Newport News




IRON DUKE, MARLBOROUGH, DELHI, BENBOW.



E. BRANDENBURG, E.K.E. AUGUSTA.




ISMAIL class.



TIGER, QUEEN ELIZABETH, WARSPITE.




DUILIO, DORIA.




JAIME I.



LORRAINE, BRETAGNE, PROVENCE.




HARUNA, KIRISHIMA.  
(FUSO not known.)



OKLAHOMA, NEVADA.

GUN PLANS OF CAPITAL SHIPS LAID DOWN IN 1912



AJAX, AUDACIOUS




PARIS, FRANCE.




KONGO, HI-YEI.




QUEEN MARY.



K. ALBERT, P.R. LUITPOLD, SEYDLITZ.



ESPANA.



TEGETTHOFF, P. EUGEN.



NEW YORK, TEXAS.

GUN PLANS OF CAPITAL SHIPS LAUNCHED IN 1912



THE NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL

The Naval Appropriation Bill for the year 1913-1914 shows the large increase of \$14,776,321.32 over the amount appropriated for 1912-13. The opponents of two battleships used this increase as one of their principal weapons against more than one capital ship. The additional amounts are almost entirely included in the "increase of the Navy." The following is the section authorizing the new construction and the amounts appropriated therefor, and for work previously authorized.

That for the purpose of further increasing the Naval Establishment of the United States the President is hereby authorized to have constructed one first-class battleship, carrying as heavy armor and as powerful armament as any vessel of its class, to have the highest practicable speed and greatest desirable radius of action, and to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not to exceed \$7,425,000: *Provided*, That the battleship herein authorized shall be built in a Government navy yard.

Six torpedo-boat destroyers, to have the highest practicable speed, to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not to exceed \$950,000 each.

Four submarine torpedo boats in an amount not exceeding in the aggregate \$2,478,936; and the sum of \$1,294,912 is hereby appropriated for said purpose.

One transport, to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not to exceed \$1,850,000.

One supply ship, to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not to exceed \$1,425,000.

The Secretary of the Navy shall build the battleship authorized in this Act in such navy yard as he may designate; and shall build any of the other vessels herein authorized in such navy yards as he may designate, should it reasonably appear that the persons, firms, or corporations, or the agents thereof, bidding for the construction of any of said vessels, have entered into any combination, agreement, or undertaking, the effect, object, or purpose of which is to deprive the Government of fair, open, and unrestricted competition in letting contracts for the constructions of any of said vessels.

*Construction and Machinery:* On account of hulls and outfits of vessels and steam machinery of vessels heretofore and herein authorized, to be available until expended, \$19,818,228.

*Increase of the Navy, Torpedo Boats:* On account of submarine torpedo boats heretofore authorized, to be available until expended, \$2,058,363.

*Increase of the Navy, Equipment:* Toward the completion of equipment outfit of the vessels heretofore and herein authorized, to be available until expended, \$430,000.

*Increase of the Navy, Armor and Armament:* Toward the armor and armament for vessels heretofore and herein authorized, to be available until expended, \$11,724,192.

Total increase of the navy heretofore and herein authorized, to be available until expended, \$35,325,695.

That no part of any sum herein appropriated shall be expended for the purchase of structural steel, ship plates, armor, arma-

ment, or machinery from any persons, firms, or corporations who have combined or conspired to monopolize the interstate or foreign commerce or trade of the United States, or the commerce or trade between the States and any Territory or the District of Columbia, in any of the articles aforesaid, and no purchase of structural steel, ship plates, or machinery shall be made at a price in excess of a reasonable profit above the actual cost of manufacture. But this limitation shall in no case apply to any existing contract.

For purposes of comparison with the Appropriation Bill passed August 22, 1912, the following table may prove useful: —

	1912-13	1913-14
Construction heretofore and herein authorized .....	9,446,205	19,818,228
Submarines herein authorized.....	1,600,000	1,294,912
Submarines heretofore authorized....	921,647	2,058,363
Equipment heretofore and herein authorized .....	355,000	430,000
Colliers heretofore authorized.....	581,321.48	
Armor and Armament heretofore and herein authorized .....	7,265,200	11,724,192
Submarine tender .....	400,000	
Total amount authorized for Increase of Navy.....	\$20,569,373.48	\$35,325,695

It appears that the principal items of increase are for construction and for armor and armament. The amount appropriated for construction is \$10,372,023 over the 1912-13 appropriation, and for armor and armament, \$4,458,992. The amount to be expended for submarines heretofore authorized shows an increase of \$1,136,716; while the amount appropriated for the Submarines authorized shows a decrease of \$405,088. The 1912-13 bill carried an appropriation of \$400,000 for a submarine tender and \$581,321.48 for colliers authorized before the passage of that bill.

An analysis of the items containing the chief increases reveals the fact that the jump from \$123,000,000 to \$140,000,000 was caused almost entirely by the failure of the preceding appropriation bills, especially that of 1912-13, to provide the necessary funds to carry out the work previously authorized.

Besides the amounts for "Increase of the Navy," the following are among the important appropriations:

Navigation .....	\$2,991,807
Public Works, Navy Yards, etc.....	4,433,945
Equipment .....	10,320,000*
Construction and Repair.....	8,250,000
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.....	7,593,441.75†

\* An increase over 1912-13 of \$1,331,700.  
† Available till June 30, 1915; a decrease of \$948,887.50 for 1912-13.



## THE NAVY DEPARTMENT

GEORGE V. L. MEYER  
*Former Secretary of the Navy*

One of the distinctive features of this administration has been the reorganization of the Navy Department.

Defects in the organization had been commented on by successive heads of the Department, almost all of whom agreed on the existing deficiencies. These secretaries made recommendations to improve the organization, but their suggestions had no result.

The most serious of these defects was the lack of a branch dealing directly with the military use of the fleet and the lack of responsible advisers to aid the Secretary in reaching conclusions on technical matters in case of disagreement between the co-ordinate branches of the Department and, generally, in deciding important matters.

The spirit of our institutions requires that the military power shall be in strict subordination to the civil power. In accord with this correct principle, we have a civilian as Secretary of the Navy, and a civilian Secretary is necessarily handicapped by lack of knowledge regarding the technical details of naval affairs.

The office of the Secretary is executive in character, and the discharge of its duties involves a multitude of activities quite beyond the immediate personal knowledge and supervision of a single man, however capable.

These duties divide under two principal heads, civil and military, which are generally distinct though closely related.

The civil duties embrace the provision or preparation of all the material of war. This is the function of the present bureaus of the Navy Department.

The military duties concern the *use* of that material, whether in war or in such exercises as conduce to fitness for operations of war.

Prior to 1842, a Board of Naval Commissioners existed, with duties in connection with the "construction, armament, equipment, and employment of vessels of war." These Commissioners acted as a board, and the members had no individual duties or responsibilities.

In 1842, the system of bureaus was established, with the chiefs of bureaus individually responsible for the duties of their own bureaus.

With this authority vested in several men, the necessity of some agency to harmonize and co-ordinate the work is apparent.

The duties of the bureaus provide for the complete

construction of ships (hull, machinery, guns, and armor), for the stores and equipment, and for the personnel.

The final purpose of all these preparations, however, is the military use of the completed ships. They must be organized in fleets and squadrons, and trained and exercised in preparation for the purpose for which they are provided.

For the direction of these military duties, no subordinate positions exist in the organization established by statute.

Defects in the organization of the Department have been commented upon by many Secretaries of the Navy.

In 1909, the President appointed a Commission, composed of two ex-Secretaries of the Navy, an ex-member of the House of Representatives, and five Rear-Admirals, to consider the question of naval organization.

This Commission found the organization defective in that there was no provision for the direction of military duties or for co-ordinating the work of the bureaus.

The Commission recommended the grouping of bureaus in logical divisions and the appointment of an advisory body consisting of the Assistant Secretary and four experienced naval officers. This recommendation was approved by the President, but no action resulted.

A board of naval officers was appointed by the present Secretary, in the summer of 1909, to consider and report on naval organization.

The recommendations of this board were practically the same as those made by the President's Commission.

After consideration, the Secretary of the Navy, with the approval of the President, put into effect a reorganization of the Department that provides for grouping the activities of the Navy under four general heads, as follows:

The Division of Operations;  
The Division of Personnel;  
The Division of Material;  
The Division of Inspections.

The Division of Operations supplies the want of a division in the Navy Department which has for its object the direction of the fleet; the preparation for war; planning the strategic movement of vessels; and, in general, the supply of expert advice to the Secretary on which he can intelligently direct the fleet as a whole.

The Division of Personnel includes the duties of providing the necessary personnel, and, thereafter, the training, care, and discipline of such personnel.

In the Division of Material is grouped the material bureaus of the Navy Department. It provides, equips,



maintains, and repairs the fleet — duties of a very extended and important character.

The Division of Inspections reports direct to the Secretary, has no responsibility for the work which it inspects, and is in no way responsible for any faults which it may be called upon to criticize.

Thus the Division of Material furnishes the completed ship and supplies her with stores ready for the personnel.

The Division of Personnel furnishes the officers and men.

The Division of Operations uses the product thus furnished to perform the duties assigned the fleet.

The Division of Inspections examines the results obtained in the various fields of activities and reports directly to the Secretary.

In order to harmonize and co-ordinate the work of the four divisions thus established, an experienced naval officer has been detailed as an Aid and responsible adviser to the Secretary for each of the four divisions.

These four Aids, constituting a council, have no executive authority and serve in an advisory capacity.

The value of the new organization is shown by the following extract from the Secretary's Annual Report, dated November 20, 1912:

I am thoroughly convinced, after a trial extending over three years, that efficient administration of the navy cannot be accomplished by a Secretary without some sort of a board or council made up of expert advisers.

#### NAVY YARDS

The organization of navy yards and the number of yards necessary for the needs of the navy has received consideration.

Prior to the present administration, a consolidation of similar shops had been inaugurated. This consolidation has been continued and extended.

The organization of the yards has been modified by dividing the manufacturing department into two divisions — hull and machinery. The organization provides for the participation of sea-going officers in the industrial work of the yards.

Sea-going officers must maintain, in an efficient condition, all the elaborate machinery on board ship; they should, therefore, have duties in connection with the repair and installation of such machinery. While an occasional return of the vessels to navy yards for periodic docking and overhauling is necessary, it is however, important that ships of the navy be as nearly self-sustaining

as is possible. In time of war, it is just as important now for the ships of a navy to be able to keep the seas as it was in the days of Nelson.

As an example of the military value of shop training, the following incident is related:

On July 3, 1898, the *Oregon* received a signal that a 13-inch gun that had received some damage the day before, during the bombardment, could be repaired at Guantanamo. The ordnance officer, who had had considerable shop experience, hearing of this signal, went to the captain and informed him that the damage to the gun was being repaired and would be finished that night and there was no occasion for the ship to leave her station. In consequence of this, the orders were revoked. If the ordnance officer had not had this shop experience, in all probability the *Oregon* would not have taken part in the battle of Santiago.

It mattered little that we had many facilities at navy yards for the repair of this gun. The *Oregon* was engaged in the blockade of the Spanish fleet at Santiago, and it was important that the ship remain in her station.

Considering the part borne by the *Oregon* in the battle of Santiago, and particularly her part in the pursuit and destruction of the last ship of the Spanish fleet, who will measure in dollars and cents the value of this officer's shop training, or say how much less complete the American victory might have been had the *Oregon* been absent that day!

Another change which has been inaugurated at navy yards is the establishment of a separate accounting office. Formerly, the cost system was in the hands of the men who did the work, which is wrong in principle. A separate accounting office was first established at the Boston Navy Yard and was then gradually extended to all others.

#### EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF NAVY YARDS

One of the causes of great expenditures in the navy is the excessive number of navy yards on the Atlantic Coast and Gulf of Mexico. The Secretary of the Navy recommended to Congress that the stations at New Orleans, Pensacola, Port Royal; New London, Sacketts Harbor, San Juan, Culebra, and Cavite be abolished, with an estimated saving of annual maintenance expense of about \$1,600,000, irrespective of the price which the Government might obtain for the properties.

Pending action by Congress, the naval stations at Pensacola, New Orleans, San Juan, Culebra, and Sitka have been closed. Coaling plants at Frenchman's Bay (Maine) and New London (Connecticut) have also been



shut down, with a view to their ultimate abandonment and the disposal of the land.

Reliable data as to the value of buildings and public property at navy yards have been lacking; therefore appraisals have been made at all yards. These appraisals were conducted in a manner similar to that used by commercial concerns.

Public works at all navy yards have been consolidated under the civil engineers.

#### THE FLEET

The fleet has been reorganized. A program has been adopted by which a number of vessels are sent in rotation to the navy yards for docking and repair, while the main force is always in cruising condition. The class of work done at each navy yard is made as nearly uniform as possible, and the amount of work is made as nearly constant throughout the year as can be arranged. This improves the quality of work, decreases its cost, and improves the condition of workmen at navy yards, by securing for them practically continuous employment.

The spirit of competition which has always existed in the navy has been encouraged. Competition in rapidity and accuracy of gunfire, competition in steaming trials, competition in the economical use of coal and supplies, and reduction in the cost of repairs, are constant incentives to improvement.

Money spent in an endeavor to improve old ships of war and bring them up-to-date is often a wasteful expenditure, and, as a rule, not justified by any corresponding gain in fighting efficiency. This policy has been discontinued and excessive changes are discouraged.

The steady improvement in readiness for service of vessels of the Navy is shown in the following table:

*Vessels of the Navy ready for service and those undergoing extensive repairs*

Class of Vessel	1909		1910		1911		1912	
	In active service or ready	Repairing	In active service or ready	Repairing	In active service or ready	Repairing	In active service or ready	Repairing
Battleships .....	17	10	18	11	26	5	33	None
Armored Cruisers ..	10	.....	10	.....	8	.....	9	1
Cruisers .....	13	14	13	14	20	12	22	5
Gunboats .....	33	5	34	2	33	1	31	2
Colliers .....	19	4	17	2	21	1	20	None
Destroyers .....	9	11	18	9	35	.....	32	8
Submarines .....	12	6	8	10	17	3	19	4
Total	113	50	118	48	160	19	166	20

Note: Four battleships are scheduled for three months' routine overhaul during the period January 1 to March 31.

For economical reasons, it is necessary to limit the number of vessels in full commission. It is important, however, that all vessels be in readiness for active service. To this end, reserve fleets on the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts have been created and organized.

#### MOBILIZATION

The best method of testing a ship's readiness for sea is to send her to sea.

As a test of the preparedness of the fleet, Secretary Meyer inaugurated, in 1911, a mobilization of ships on the east and west coasts and at Manila. It is only in this way that the readiness of the ships can be demonstrated and it is important to know the difficulties and any defects that may exist. It is wiser to learn and correct deficiencies each year than have them revealed first in times of emergency.

The mobilization was repeated this year.

At the mobilization of the United States Atlantic Fleet at New York, in 1911, there were 24 battleships, 2 armored cruisers, and 72 smaller vessels, representing a total displacement of 576,634 tons.

There were 1,124 officers and 25,378 enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps attached to these vessels.

During the review held at New York from the 12th to the 15th of October, 1912, there were 31 battleships, 4 armored cruisers, and 88 smaller vessels, representing a total displacement of 720,486 tons. There were attached to these vessels 1,300 officers and 27,464 enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps.

Simultaneously with the mobilization of all available vessels in the Atlantic at New York, there was held a similar mobilization at Manila of all vessels that could be assembled there.

The table to illustrate readiness for service shows that in 1909 there were 163 vessels, of which 113, or 69 per cent were ready; in 1912 this condition had so improved that the force had increased to 186 vessels, of which 166, or 89 per cent were ready; also, as to the battleships, constituting the real strength of the Navy, all were ready.

The appropriations for the naval establishment for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1909, were \$136,935,199.05; the appropriations have steadily decreased to \$123,151,538.76 for the present fiscal year.

In other words, the naval force has steadily increased, the ships show a higher degree of preparedness, and the annual appropriations have decreased.



### FIXING LONGITUDE BY WIRELESS FLASHES

In order to determine the exact longitude between Washington and Paris, a series of important tests have been conducted by representatives of the American and French governments. The powerful radio stations at Arlington, Virginia, and Eiffel Tower, Paris, were employed for the purpose of direct and practically instantaneous communication.

Professor Asaph Hall, of the Naval Observatory, was delegated to Paris by the Navy Department, and, together with Commander H. H. Hough, the United States Naval Attaché at Paris, assisted with the experiments from the Eiffel Tower, on behalf of the United States government; while Lieutenant Ludovic Drisencort and Lieutenant Charles de Vaisseau Gignon of the French Navy, and Colonel Gustave Ferrie and Captain Paul Levesque of the army, were chosen by the French government to witness the tests from Washington. All of these officials were selected with particular reference to their scientific qualifications for conducting such important experiments, which require absolute precision in every detail.

The general plan for gathering this important information, which has but recently been made possible by perfection of long distance wireless transmission, was to flash signals from the respective towers, and to record the exact local time by means of chronographs adjusted to register thousandths of a second, which were checked by astronomical observations. From the resultant differences in time between the two places the difference in longitude was calculated.

In the first tests, the signals from Arlington Station were received on the Eiffel tower, but the signals from Paris did not reach Arlington.

At a later date, other tests will be made to confirm the data obtained, to guard against the possibility of error in working out the details of the experiments. The final figures will not only fix the longitude between Washington and Paris with absolute exactness, but will also be used as part of a concerted effort by the great nations to gather similar data for the preparation of an official map of the world which will be mathematically correct.

Experiments somewhat similar to those recently conducted, have been made several times between Washington and Greenwich, by aid of the Atlantic cables; and while the results obtained were approximately correct, they were not absolutely accurate on account of the intervention of the human agencies that were necessary in the transmission of the submarine signals.

It is believed that, by elimination of the personal equa-

tion by the use of entirely automatic radio flashes, the results attained will be of inestimable value as a basis for all future calculations.

The experimental work at the Naval Observatory at Washington was conducted by Commander J. L. Jayne, while the operation of the wireless apparatus at Arlington was supervised by Commander W. H. G. Bullard, who has charge of all United States naval wireless stations.

C. F. Thompson.

### WIRELESS NOTES

The scout cruiser *Salem*, which made a trip across the Atlantic for the purpose of testing the working efficiency of the Arlington wireless station before final acceptance from the contractors by the government, has returned and reported to the Navy Department.

While no official statement has been made public concerning the result of the official tests, there is every reason to believe that they were satisfactory.

#### *Wave Lengths*

Following a series of experiments by the American Association for the Advancement of Science of Cleveland, Ohio, the following results have been announced regarding radio wave lengths: an increase in the height of the aerial will cause a corresponding increase in the optimum wave lengths; an increase in power displaces the optimum wave lengths in the direction of longer waves; inefficient aerials will reduce the optimum wave lengths; an increase of absorption will produce an increase in the optimum wave lengths, as well as an increase in radiation efficiency produced by the use of a synchronous rotary spark gap.

#### *Experiments with Horizontal Antennae*

German engineers have constructed a wireless station at Belzig for experimenting with horizontal antennae. Six radials 350 to 1,000 feet in length, having connection with the wireless instruments in the center and grounded at each end, are being used. Signals from various European stations have been clearly received, but the report does not say whether any success has been attained in the transmission of messages. The antennae extending in the direction of the sending station only is used which considerably minimizes liability to confusion. The value of this invention from a military viewpoint lies in the fact that no masts are required, it only being necessary to lay out a wire in the direction of the station it is desired to communicate with.



*Narragansett Bay Station*

The Narragansett Bay wireless station communicated recently with the steamship *Berlin*, which was only one day out from Germany. The same station reports having received messages from Mare Island and San Francisco.

*Egypt—Key West*

A communication from the Lloyds' wireless station located at Cairo, Egypt, addressed to the Commandant of the Key West Naval Station, states that the operators at the Egyptian station frequently read messages sent out from the Key West station.

This probably breaks the record for long distance transmission, as the distance involved is over seven thousand miles.

*Marconi Trans-Pacific System*

The Marconi Company has awarded a contract to a New York engineering corporation for the construction of eight powerful wireless stations for its trans-Pacific system, to be located in Massachusetts, New Jersey, California, and the Sandwich Islands. The stations will be erected in pairs, thirty miles apart, so that there will be no interference between incoming and outgoing signals. The power plants to operate these stations will have a capacity of one thousand kilowatts and will have a range of from four thousand to six thousand miles. The antennae will consist of a series of towers having an aggregate height of eighty miles, if placed end on end. Forty miles of wire will be used for making the earth connections at each station. It is claimed that these stations will not only permit of transmission across the Pacific Ocean, but will materially increase the speed and capacity of the trans-Atlantic service.

*Wireless Telephone Experiments*

Professor Chaffee, of Harvard University, who is conducting a series of wireless telephone experiments, states that speech has been distinctly transmitted a distance of thirty-five miles with his apparatus. He claims that the instruments are practical and simple, and while no effort has been made to establish a limit of transmission, he believes that the telephones as now constructed have a radius of several hundred miles.

Wireless reception can be much improved by connecting a condenser of proper capacity in parallel around the telephones. The capacity can best be determined by experiment with a variable condenser, and it will be found to vary with different distances as well as with different stations. The harmonics of the sending station appear to affect this capacity more than the frequency of the break.

## AVIATION

Rear Admiral Cameron McRae Winslow, commander of the first division of the Atlantic fleet, took a fifteen-minute flight with Lieutenant Towers, at Guantanamo, on March 12, in one of the navy's flying boats.

Lieutenant Towers, in company with Ensign Chevalier, flew from Guantanamo to Santiago, a distance of forty-five miles, in forty-six minutes, at an altitude of about two thousand feet, and returned the next day, against a head wind, in one hour and seventeen minutes. These flights make a record for American naval aviation.

*International Race*

An international race for the Jacques Schneider Maritime Aviation Cup, the first of the big races of 1913, will be over a distance of one hundred and fifty nautical miles. Any club belonging to the International Federation is eligible to the competition. The winning club is to have charge of the next competition.

*Great Lakes Cruise*

Great enthusiasm is expressed by manufacturers of aeroplanes and aviators over the proposed cruise of hydroplanes from Chicago to Detroit that has been planned to start July 8. The Aero and Hydro management report that ten aero boats have already been entered by the various manufacturers, among whom are The Glenn Curtis Company, the Benoist Company, and The Washington Aeroplane Co.

A purse of \$25,000 to \$30,000 is assured from popular subscriptions.

*London to France*

The distance of 287 miles between London and Paris was covered by Marcel G. A. Brinejone des Moullinais, on February 26, in 185 minutes. The new record was made in a Morane-Saulnier monoplane driven by a Gnome motor.

*Wright-Curtis Decision*

Orville Wright has won a notable legal victory over his competitor, Glenn H. Curtis. Judge John R. Hazel of the Federal Court handed down a decision at Buffalo, on February 26, sustaining the contention of the Wright Company in the case of four alleged infringements. The Curtis Company state that they will appeal from Judge Hazel's decision, with the expectation of securing a reversal of the recent decision. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that judgment has been in favor of the Wright patents in the supreme court of the German Empire at Leipzig, where a suit for the cancellation of the Wright patents in Germany was argued. The lower



court had disallowed the Wright Company's general claim, while admitting the validity of the Company's claim to the steering and flexing patents.

#### *Fear of Aerial Spies*

The British Aerial Navigation Bill renders aviators who pass over forts, royal dock-yards, or arsenals liable to be shot at. Foreign airships crossing Great Britain do so at their peril, unless their pilots declare the objects of their journey.

#### *The Monoplane and the British Government*

After a thorough investigation by a department committee, appointed to investigate the series of monoplane accidents that occurred during the past year, the prohibition of the use of the monoplane by the British government has been lifted.

### SERVICE NOTES

#### *Atlantic Fleet Target Practice*

For spring target practice the fleet will go to Tangier Sound, on March 24. The *Florida* will fire first in spotting practice. After the spotting practice, the vessels will rendezvous five miles east of Cape Henry until practice is completed. Firing is to be conducted by divisions, all the ships of the fleet participating, except the *Virginia*, *Vermont*, *Georgia*, and *Nebraska*, which are now in Mexican ports, and the *Arkansas* and *Kansas*, which are in dry dock. These vessels will fire later.

The *Utah*, *Michigan*, and *Ohio* will fire first. The *Florida*, *North Dakota*, and *Wyoming* will have target practice on April 2.

The Commander-in-Chief has so arranged the dates of the practice that Secretary Daniels can witness the firing and see also the experimental firing by the *Idaho* and *Minnesota*.

The *Rhode Island*, *New Hampshire*, and *Delaware* will leave home ports March 31, and will be the last vessels to hold target practice.

Naval officers on shore duty will visit the fleet to observe the practice, and the usual invitation will be extended to the War Department and naval militia officers to witness it.

An auxiliary vessel, to be designated later by the Commander-in-Chief, will convey observers from fortress Monroe to Tangier Sound. The Secretary of the Navy and other Cabinet officers will leave Washington on the evening of April 1, in the *Mayflower* and *Dolphin*. They will meet the Commander-in-Chief in Lynnhaven Roads on the morning of April 2.

The presence of the Secretary of the Navy will give

added stimulus to the target practice, which will furnish the new Secretary an exceptional opportunity of seeing the methods of firing and management of the fleet during a practice which annually costs the country \$1,000,000.

#### *Asiatic Fleet*

A despatch from Rear Admiral Nicholson on board the *Rainbow* states that destroyers and submarines had completed spring target practice on March 17.

The *Monadnock* and *Mohican* have been appointed receiving ships at Olongapo and Cavite respectively.

#### *The Pennsylvania*

The contract for building the *Pennsylvania* was signed on February 27, by Secretary Meyer and agents of the Newport News Shipbuilding Company. The contract calls for the building of the *Pennsylvania* according to the Department's plans and specifications, except that the designs for the propelling machinery is to be according to the builder's specifications. The contract is for \$7,260,000, and calls for the completion of the vessel in thirty-six months. Particulars of the contract were given in the March number of THE NAVY.

#### *Accident to Marines*

Three marines were killed, and Captain Edward A. Greene and several others were injured, in a train wreck, while proceeding to La Paz, Nicaragua, to prevent the looting of the town by a gang of desperadoes.

#### *The Paducah*

The *Paducah* is making a survey of the shoal on which the *Arkansas* struck recently. The shoal is said to be formed by coral heads, with deep water between it and the Ceibu bank.

#### *The Galveston*

The *Galveston*, under command of Lieutenant H. N. Jensen, left the navy yard at Bremerton for a seven-day endurance test in five hours and fifteen minutes after receiving orders issued by Rear Admiral Alfred Reynolds, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Reserve Fleet.

#### *The Niagara*

Perry's old flagship, the *Niagara*, was raised from the bottom of Lake Erie, on March 6, where it had rested for nearly one hundred years. The ice of the lake was cut away and four chains placed under the hull, by means of which it was brought to the surface. Pontoons were placed beneath the old vessel, and it will eventually be towed to Erie and reconstructed.



## A STRONG NAVY ESSENTIAL TO THE UNITED STATES

CHARLES H. STOCKTON  
*Rear Admiral, U.S.N., Retired*

*Speech delivered before the University of Chicago*

The old maxim of Washington, "In time of peace prepare for war," becomes more and more pertinent and imperative in modern times, with the quick movements that occur at the time of the outbreak of hostilities, which is nearly coincident with the declaration of war.

The recent wars between Italy and Turkey and the Balkan States and Turkey should be sufficient evidence as to this celerity at this time. . . .

Wars are not eliminated and armaments still increase, and woe to any country which leaves its coast, its coast towns, and its export trade subject to injury and destruction on account of a weak navy. The first line of defence for our coasts and seaborne trade is the navy and the navy alone. The sea is no longer an obstruction, but is, on the contrary, a pathway for powerful foes to reach an enemy's coast, and especially for blockades, both commercial and military. Increase of speed and increase of carrying capacity of vessels, makes the ocean shrink in size and danger. Germany, for instance, now can transport to the United States a quarter of a million soldiers under armed convoy in a fortnight.

The time consumed in building a battle ship,—the capital ships of a navy,—is, generally speaking, more than three years from the completion of the plans and preliminaries until the time it is ready to take its place in the line-of-battle for action. Three months, on the other hand, is a long time between the beginning of an acute diplomatic situation and the outbreak of war. There are, besides, no up-to-date battleships in the market for sale.

So great, then, is the importance of these principal units for the line of battle in a naval war that each nation keeps a close scrutiny as to the number of battleships in the possession of other nations. These are checked off, and, in time of peace, are a controlling factor in many cases as to the question of peace or war.

As a matter of common safety and defence, every year should be a year of preparation and construction. It is emphatically a case of advance or retrogression. The wealth of this country as a temptation, combined with its possible aggressive and not unusually offensive policy toward such nations as Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and Japan, makes its safety from humiliation depend upon its naval strength. Even at the present moment, German military writers call the attention of England to

her serious mistake in not taking sides with the South in the Civil War and by forcing division rendering both sections weaker.

In preparing this paper, it may be well to say here that I have consulted, among other works, Norman Angell's "Great Illusion," Mahan's "Armaments and Arbitration," and, after cursory reading, Homer Lea's "Valor of Ignorance," which has occasional flashes of truth varied by half truths, exaggerations, and errors.

Let us now look geographically at the United States, with its sea-coast on the Atlantic, on the Gulf of Mexico, and on the Pacific Ocean, and in addition, the Great Lakes, making its position almost insular. The Pacific coast line is especially vulnerable; for, unless we have two large fleets, the strength of the navy will primarily be retained upon the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and waters, not only on account of the protection needed for the Canal, outside of the range of the guns of its local fortifications; not only, as Mahan points out, on account of the weight of attack possible from Europe, where the great fleets of the world are maintained; but also because the elements for the sustenance of a fleet are more abundant, cheaper, and less remote on the Atlantic than on the Pacific side. Of course, the opening of the Panama Canal will help the mobility and shorten the time of transfer of the fleet to the Pacific. At present, four months would be required to reach the Hawaiian Islands from the Atlantic; but when the Canal is open, this will be reduced to less than four weeks.

Now, as to arbitration: it has been most useful as a preventive of war and in stilling controversy. It, with its child, the judicial settlement of international disputes, should always be utilized whenever possible. But, after study, especially of present history, I cannot find that it will eliminate all wars. Arbitration has its limitations; there are some questions that, rightly or wrongly, nations or peoples will not leave to arbitration. Take the question of the Monroe Doctrine—the people of the United States would not consent, even after the restriction in the Doctrine which I advocate later, to put this doctrine and its workings under arbitration. It is not recognized, elsewhere than in America,—except to an extent by Great Britain,—as an international law, and it could be brushed aside if we had a weak mobile naval force. The force of the Concert of Powers in Europe does not exist in the agreement of the Powers, or its legality, but in the military force represented behind them: so with the Monroe doctrine.

So with the Pacific coast question of the Chinese and other exclusions, favored to avoid a lowering of our plane of civilization. They are of better international



standing than the Monroe Doctrine as of the rights incident to the existence of a State; but our action alone in regard to the exclusion of Jews in Russia, puts our Exclusion Act in a category in which the matter is sustained by force rather than consistency or logic. It is too vital to the Pacific Coast to trust to arbitration.

Consider the limitations of arbitration, as shown by Mahan, in regard to the subjects of previous wars of our own. For instance, the formation of our own country made possible by our Revolutionary war: would it have been possible to have reached it technically by arbitration? Would we have submitted to a continuation of the English rule in case of an adverse decision?

The war of 1812 was fought out on account of an untenable claim by Great Britain for visitation and search of vessels. Great Britain would not have submitted to arbitration upon this matter, as she claimed this, not as a matter of right, but as a vital matter of self-defense and existence to be asserted only by force.

So with the Civil War: we would not have risked secession and the rights of States by arbitration; while the abolition of slavery, in the early stages of the war, was incidental only to the question of secession and the war for the Union, and became afterwards vital and an accomplished fact as a war measure and the result of force.

So with the Spanish-American war: the freedom of Cuba was not a legal question for arbitration; the Gordian knot could only be severed by force.

As to a past question in the Pacific, it must not be forgotten that in 1897 Japan intimated to the United States that it could not see without concern the annexation by the United States of the Hawaiian Islands. A plurality of the population of these islands was then, and I believe is still, Japanese.

Now, as to our dangers in case of war, it is true that a conquest of the United States of America as a whole, in case of war, is not probable or even possible; but a stronger naval and military power can bring us dismemberment, and at all times humiliation or terms that would be almost unendurable,—such as a surrender of the Panama Canal, the surrender of the Monroe Doctrine, a free admission of Asiatic immigration, an obligation requiring either restriction or permanent reduction in our navy to low terms. Take results in actual warfare against a superior naval power accompanied by a blockade. The suffering from a blockade would not be limited to San Francisco or New York or other Atlantic sea ports. A blockade in checking imports, and especially exports, would be felt to the heart of Chicago. The blockade of the Southern ports during our Civil War was felt, not

only in Wilmington and Charleston, but at Richmond and in the center of the Confederacy. Cotton could not go out, European goods could not come in, and there is little doubt, in the minds of the most thorough historians, North or South, that no one element of that war contributed to the downfall of the Confederacy more than the constantly tightening blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports of the Southern Coast.

Even in the War of 1812, after the final establishment of the British blockade in the last year,—too little known and dwelt upon by our historians,—Jefferson wrote as follows, Virginia having suffered most from the blockade:—

By the total annihilation in value of the produce which was to give me sustenance and independence, I shall be like Tantalus,—up to the shoulders in water, yet dying with thirst. We can make indeed enough to eat, drink, and clothe ourselves, but nothing for our salt, iron, groceries, and *taxes* which must be paid in money. For what can we raise for the market? Wheat? we only give it to our horses, as we have been doing ever since harvest. Tobacco? it is not worth the pipe it is smoked in.

Think of the blockade and its effect upon the export trade of the great central interior of the United States, culminating in Chicago in the north, and New Orleans, the logical port to the Panama Canal, in the south. We would be denied access to the Canal, and the sea trade to the Pacific Ocean by any route would be extinguished and the materials composing the foreign trade to New York would be rotting on the way, with no exit at New York or the Atlantic ports. Think of the millions of people dependent upon transportation alone, without considering manufactures, directly and indirectly, in and from Chicago, east or south. At that time, at least, the connection of a strong navy with Chicago and the middle west would be only too painfully evident.

People say that it would be impossible to lose the canals. Why impossible? Even in peace time such a loss is possible. Who built the Suez Canal? France. Who now controls the Suez Canal? England.

As to the Panama Canal in its relation to this area of the United States, Hon. O. P. Austin, a distinguished government statistician, in an address in this city in 1911, said:—

The relation of the Panama Canal to the Mississippi Valley may be stated in a single sentence. The Mississippi Valley cannot attain complete commercial success without the Panama Canal; the Panama Canal cannot attain complete commercial success without the Mississippi Valley, re-inforced by deeper waterways from the Lakes to the Gulf.

In addition to the deep water routes by which the Gulf and Atlantic is reached directly, there are 19,000



miles of internal navigable rivers, 150,000 miles of railway,—one-fourth of the railway mileage of the world,—in the Mississippi Valley. The production of cotton in the United States is three-fourths of the world's supply, the Mississippi Valley producing seventy per cent of that staple.

While trade in foodstuffs for export is decreasing, that of manufactures, especially manufactures of iron and steel, is increasing. Our country is the greatest manufacturer in the world, and the Mississippi Valley turns out forty per cent of the product of the United States.

If we are to increase our exports of manufactures, continues Mr. Austin, it must be by increasing the trade with the sections of the world which require that class of merchandise; and while it is true that manufactures form forty-five per cent of our exports as a whole, the fact that they form seventy-five per cent of the exports to Asia and eighty-five per cent of those to Oceania and South America and but thirty-five per cent of those to Europe renders an enlargement of the *Pacific* trade of special importance to the Mississippi Valley.

Hence the importance of the Canal for our greatest future product—a Canal that should be as free and unvexed as the great Mississippi itself.

There are limits to arbitration, as I have repeatedly said. Certain prophets of peace have favored the formation of international police to enforce arbitration, in order that treaties should be kept and arbitration verdicts sustained. This is not a new plan and dates back many centuries.

Oppenheim speaks of these plans as follows:—

The first of these schemes was that of the French lawyer Pierre Dubois, who, as early as 1306, in "De Recuperatione Terre Sancte" proposed an alliance between all Christian Powers for the purpose of the maintenance of peace and the establishment of a Permanent Court of Arbitration for the settlement of differences between the members of the alliance. Another project arose in 1461, when Podiebrad, King of Bohemia from 1420-1471, adopted the scheme of his Chancellor, Antoine Marini, and negotiated with foreign courts the foundation of a Federal State to consist of all the existing Christian States, with a permanent Congress, seated at Basle, of ambassadors of all the member States as the highest organ of the Federation. A third plan was that of Sully, adopted by Henry IV of France, which proposed the division of Europe into fifteen States and the linking together of these into a federation, with a General Council as its highest organ, consisting of Commissioners deputed by the member States. A fourth project was that of Emeric Crucée, who, in 1623, proposed the establishment of a Union consisting, not only of the Christian States, but of all States then existing in the whole of the world, with a General Council as its highest organ, seated at Venice, and consisting of ambassadors of all the member States of the Union.

Force was to be provided back of all of the edicts of these bodies and States, to execute them. But these are

resignations of the vocation and volition of a sovereign state to that of an international organization. By our present status and probable future action as to treaties, it is more than likely we will not always follow the dictum of *treaties*. Will we then accede to the rattle, for instance, of the sabre in the scabbard of a syndicate?

In my opinion, we cannot accept such a short-cut to peace by placing the sovereignty of the world in the hands of a syndicate or group of nations and thus compel arbitration and the decisions of arbitral courts by force. This would make for the *supreme power* in the syndicate of the more warlike nations, these having the largest standing armies and navies. Their will, not justice, would prevail. Fancy a combined movement against us by Germany and Great Britain as the instruments of such a syndicate. To them would fall the rôle of the controlling factors of the world. We would have to resign our nationality, our patriotism; our flag would become meaningless, and our identity and history fade away. This would be included in the dictum that we must have peace if we have to *fight* for it. Patriotism would be sacrificed to pure reign of force and a subservience to military power.

One of the principal questions in regard to our foreign policy is the Monroe Doctrine. Personally, I favor the reduction of the area of the Monroe Doctrine to an area consisting of the waters and coasts and islands north and west of the Orinoco river. The countries south of that river do not welcome the Monroe Doctrine; are suspicious of it and of the great republic of the north. As an instance of this, I would mention that in both the Argentine and Venezuelan republics, subscriptions were formed during the Spanish-American war to build vessels of war for Spain to fight us. Their geographical position is too far distant from us and their strength too great to need us, so that without their request we are not justified in any interference with their matters, as they are much closer, not only by distance, but by affinity, race, and religion, with the Latin countries of Europe. With the growing strength of Chile, the Argentine Republic and Brazil, they can enforce the Monroe Doctrine themselves for South America south of the Spanish Main.

The Caribbean Sea and the Spanish Main as its shore line on the south are closely identified with our country, not only on account of proximity, but because the Caribbean Sea is the great approach on this side to the Panama Canal, becoming, as it were, the American Mediterranean, whose control should be *always* in our hands. We should adopt a more positive policy in regard to them, and, while forbidding interference with this territory on the part of



European countries, in our own turn supervise them to an extent that should cause them to behave themselves in a civilized manner. Hayti, about three days from New York, is still a land of semi-cannibalism, negro fetich, and constant revolutions. We should not play the part of the dog-in-the-manger concerning her to the Christian world. . . .

In general, the countries of the West Indies, Mexico, and Central America alternate light comedy with deep tragedy. All of this possible duty means a strong navy, second only to Great Britain, with whom we should always be on terms of peace, our Pacific coasts having common interests with each other and with Australasia.

Norman Angell's arguments in the "Great Illusion," while true as to the important restraint exercised by capital upon war, gives only a partial statement of the matter. Wars are largely also matters of fierce sentiment, without regard to money affairs. The Balkan war, for example, is to an extent a war for territory, but largely a war of resentment against Turkish rule and the accompanying cruelty towards Christians. The independence gained by previous wars to countries like Roumania, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro was through wars which primarily benefited the countries in question by release from Turkish rule, but also, in a material sense, brought therewith an acquisition of self-government and added prosperity.

Finally, I do not suggest a thoughtless and illogical increase of the navy, notwithstanding the circumstances that I have shown which may occur at any time to bring us to war against other naval powers, but I believe in a consecutive policy adopted by a Council of Defense composed of several members of the Cabinet of the administration in power and of the leading members of the Congress, combined with a few members from the army and navy, the majority being civilians. After all, the people, through their representatives, are responsible for the size and the efficiency of our navy.

If the powers of the world reduce their armaments, we can automatically and in unison reduce our naval building policy; and I trust that with the consideration that should exist and be shown in the family of nations toward one another, that this reduction of naval units, really originating from a conflict of wills, can be brought about. But, first of all, we must, as members of a family of nations, mend our manners; for we have the responsibilities as well as the powers of a great world state commonly classed as Christian. Meanwhile, it would be suicidal not to have a strong navy. . . .

## THE ABOLITION OF THE NAVY

W. W. KIMBALL

*Rear Admiral, U.S.N., Retired*

*Address delivered before the Commercial Club of Toledo, Ohio*

Your Secretary, at the instance of the Navy League, was good enough to ask me to come here and talk to you, accepted the full responsibility of the probability of my boring you to distraction, and gave me carte blanche as to the topic I would talk upon.

The Navy League is very good to me, and therefore I feel a bit squeamish over the treachery toward it that I am about to commit. It knows I have carte blanche as to topic, but it expects me to follow the general trend of League work and plead for a larger navy.

I am not going to do that. I do not believe in pleading with the people of the United States to induce them to spend their money on their own affairs for their own interests, about which interests they can readily get all knowledge necessary for deciding whether to spend that money or not.

I never did believe in the Navy Department's asking Congress for a cent of appropriations, much less pleading and begging for money to build up the Service. From my viewpoint, the Department has done its whole duty in regard to getting money for the navy when it has shown the necessities of the case and how much, in its opinion, those necessities will cost. It should then be for the people to decide how much they wish to spend on their navy and to see to it that Congress provides that much money; for the Department to spend that money, in so far as the people will allow, in such a way as to get the most naval efficiency per dollar invested. I will refer to this extra expense required by the people, later on.

No; I am not going to plead for a larger navy. It's this way: practically all my life, I've been two kinds of a person,—a servant of the people and a sovereign citizen of the United States of America. Since my retirement from active service and the consequent taking up of civilian life, I have grown to be *more* of a sovereign citizen and therefore have come to take the civilian point of view and to feel acutely the horror of the awful cost of a real Navy.

So to-night, in spite of what the Navy League may expect of me, I propose, if you will allow me, to advocate "The Abolition of the Navy at the Earliest Practicable Date;" and "Meanwhile the Maintenance of the Littlest Navy We Can Afford."



The Peace Societies, whose efforts for peace do not tend to bring on war any more than the chief cause of modern wars,—drops in prices of commodities that the business men think war will rectify by changing trade channels in favor of the victors,—though perhaps those peace efforts do tend to bring on war more than the secondary and tertiary causes,—greed for another country's territory and racial and religious antipathies,—the Peace societies have plainly shown us why the navy should be abolished, but they have failed to tell us when. I will, with your kind permission, run over two of the more popular counts among the many against the existence of the navy, and over one futile count in favor of retaining it alive, and incidentally clearly show the approximate date when its abolition will be complete.

The first and well-newspapered Peace Society count is to the effect that the existence of the navy has made us, and is continuing to make us, a nation of bloody cut-throats; this is clear, when we consider that the primary duty of a navy is to prevent war and that the having something to prevent war would naturally make us want to go to war and kill people all the time.

Abolish the navy and we will no longer have those tendencies.

When I first began to absorb the truths put forth by the Peace Societies, this point was not clear to me. I was so stupid that, though I knew the shining truth was there, it was badly blurred to my mental vision until a beautiful and clarifying analogy came to my aid—the likeness of action of preventative forces. Although no one in this audience would need a demonstration of the truth under discussion, I will give one, for use when any of you fall across a person as dense as I was.

The navy, is, theoretically at least, a preventative of war. The police is, theoretically at least, a preventative of stealing. If we have no navy, we would never wish to go to war; but having one, we all want to go to war all the time. If we had no police, we would never, any of us, wish to steal; but having a police, we all want to steal all the time.

Abolish the navy and there would be never any war; abolish the police and there would be never any stealing.

There is no logic so beautiful as Peace Society logic,—when one drops into its delightful flow.

We Peace Society sympathizers recognize the fact that the natural procedure in abolishing trouble preventatives would be to first remove internal peace-keepers and get a bit of experience in living in our own country unrestrained by force, before applying the system internationally,—experiencing, for example, the practical beauty

of having a court's decree carried out without there being any rude force to support it; as when a judge should kindly ask a convicted murderer to go and gently hang himself, since there was no one about whose duty it was to attend to the matter. Then, next, to abolish international trouble preventatives; but for all nations to abolish their navies at the same time, since if, for example, all but one nation did so, that one nation, as has been shown, would surely grow internationally murderous and kill people all about everywhere with never a let or hindrance to the blood-letting.

Therefore it is quite clear that the date for the safe abolition of our navy will be a little later,—a century or two later,—than the date of the abolition of police, sheriffs, sheriffs' posses, and peace officers of all kinds by the last nation in the world to relinquish its municipal forces for the keeping of the peace.

The second, and still better, newspapered count against the navy is that its cost is too enormous to be borne as a naval appropriation and should be used to build more school-houses and buy more school books, instead.

No demonstration is needed to show us the enormous cost of the navy. A single ship costs millions of dollars; a single target practice costs thousands of dollars. But the desirability of using the naval appropriation money for school houses and school books does not seem absolute to all of us, the people, because some of us hold that the amount of teaching things that aren't so, in our schools, is already sufficiently large.

I wished very much to patriotically suggest a use for the naval appropriations that would be fitting and seem pleasing to all; and, in casting about to find what great popular need this money would fill, I discovered that the enormous annual cost of the navy was equal to the annual cost of all the chewing gum and of half the candy consumed in our glorious country. So it is clear that if we would abolish the navy, we might, with no increase in present appropriations, chew two tablets of chewing gum where one is now chewed and eat three chocolate drops where two are now eaten, and so have our national development go onward forever in ruminance, sweetness, and peace.

It is a beautiful picture; so beautiful that I was impelled to show it to my fellow sovereign citizens, in the press. But alas! no great number of them seem to grasp the beauty of the suggestion, and many of them seem to prefer that of Dr. David Star Jordan in a paper entitled, "What shall we say?" published in the January "Atlantic Monthly."

As nearly as I can make out, Dr. Jordan suggests that



we take the total cost of the navy from the birth of the nation and with it pay a single American workman for his labor for two million years. Now, no American workman wants to work for two million years, and if he did, there would be no really good way of assuring ourselves that a *quid pro quo* was had for our money. My suggestion, however, is entirely practicable, since so very many of us would be delighted by the extra allowance of chewing gum and chocolate drops.

It is true that the enormous cost of the navy is more enormous than it might be upon a basis of most naval efficiency per dollar invested, because we, the people, like to make the navy more expensive than it need be and then pretend we don't know we do it. We like to provide and support enough useless naval stations, in granting the hold-up demands of different localities for a part of the naval appropriation money, to make our naval expenditures ridiculous and then wonder why they are so.

If we, the people, decide to have a number of sister ships built, do we consult economy and get low building bids due to the fact that they may all be built by the same firm, so that the saving that comes from the duplication of parts may be taken advantage of? Not at all. At great expense to ourselves, we provide that the work shall be distributed among different builders, in order to encourage the shipyards,—which would seem to be an excellent policy as policy, but a drain on the naval appropriations. Then we pretend that we really can't imagine why the ships should cost more than they might. We always did delight in playing little games with ourselves.

For example, we, the people, always knew perfectly well that, next to agriculture, an ocean-carrying trade and commerce was the most important factor in our national growth and national self-dependence, in independence of other nations. And yet, in applying our method of protecting and encouraging our manufactures,—a far less important factor in national life,—we gave away our ocean-carrying trade and made ourselves a crippled, one-sided nation. We pay other peoples to do our ocean carrying ten—twenty—times the cost of a real navy and then pretend we don't know we have lost anything, or, if we have, that we don't know how to get it back, when all the time we know all about the loss and how to recover it.

There is, of course, a great difference between the bookkeeping cost and the real or economic cost of the navy to the country. As an advocate for the abolition of the navy, I prefer to contemplate the big figures of the naval appropriations and shudder over them, while ignoring the big sums of money that come back to our

people in wages and in payment for material, and while declining to understand that the training of the personnel and the trades and knowledge acquired in that training are beneficial to the country in improving the all-around efficiency of the population. I decline to understand that there is any use in teaching a lot of young Americans the national seaman's trade—the trade of learning how to live and how to die and how to fight,—the trade of doing one's duty to one's country, and, incidentally, of learning how to differentiate between patriotism and national self-conceit.

I know it's all nonsense, because I know that none of the navy men ever have learned to do their whole duty. There never was but one man in the world who did. He was hanged upon a cross almost a couple of thousand years ago.

Yes; the navy should be abolished, because it costs so enormously. I have proved that to my entire satisfaction, and if I have been a bit discursive, not to say meandering, in developing the proof, please remember that I am a Peace Society sympathizer—and we are all that way.

The count in favor of a navy is that it provides a preventative of, an insurance against, war; a guarantee of peace and against national humiliation and disaster.

This notion has been harped upon almost *ad nauseam* within the last decade or so, and the idea has been so threshed out and threshed over that even some of us, perhaps most of us Peace Society people, are willing to allow that there is a basis of truth in the claim, and that therefore, so long as other nations maintain great navies, it might be well for us to have one; but it should be like Maryatt's servant-girl's unexpected baby, "such a very little one."

The use of this insurance argument in support of the maintenance of a navy is rather curious.

Some years ago we proposed to stop naval increase at the very time we were surely and certainly drifting into war with a powerful nation—a war that seemed certain to bring us nothing but national humiliation and the consequent recourse to our old cheap policy of not acknowledging to ourselves that we were humiliated when our humiliation was patent to ourselves and to all the world. That war was stopped by the luck that happened to give us three new ships just then, and the good judgment that gave us a mobilization of the fleet, just in time.

Meanwhile, I was badly frightened, and, what is more to the point, my economic Yankee soul was shocked by the contemplation of the billions and billions the war



would cost us, which could so readily be saved by a few millions invested in naval increase; and so, in a magazine article, "Insurance of Property Against War Risks," I advanced the idea that a navy could prevent war at the cost of a small, very small, percentage of the value of property exposed to war losses.

I hoped that the notion would appeal to us, the people, to us, the keen business people; but never an idea fell flatter than did the one put forth to die in that magazine article. For a long time there was no evidence that the attention of any one had been caught; but at last, in the McKinley campaign, a distinguished senator used some of the stuff in appealing for a naval increase; and then, gradually, the idea grew in acceptance, until now, all over the world, the most common argument in favor of maintaining a navy is based upon the insurance-against-war idea.

Well, that is as it should be, since the only excuse for the existence of our navy lies in its two war preventative functions, the prevention of the beginning of war, or, if war be begun, the prevention of its continuance.

That is what most of us, the people, now think, when we think about the navy at all,—otherwise than as a collection of seamen who seem to us to be men addicted to chewing tobacco, hitching up their trousers, and dancing hornpipes because 'tis their nature so and because their officers are a tyrannical, snobbish, and unpopular lot.

But we Peace Society folk don't believe in paying out money for war material to prevent fighting. If the money is to be spent, then we want our money's worth in battle and in gore.

This was made very clear at the New York Peace Society meeting on January 30, when, in speaking of the required naval increase for this year, Mr. Andrew Carnegie declared that "Not one of the three additional battleships demanded, if built, in all probability will ever fire a shot against a foe, but they will rust in uselessness, \$45,000,000 needlessly squandered"—squandered just as fire insurance payments are squandered when the insured buildings do not burn down.

No, we peace people do not believe in building ships whose known capabilities will prevent fighting. When we expend money on ships capable of firing hostile shots, we propose that the said hostile shots shall be fired against some old foe or other and that gore shall flow, as Mr. Carnegie so lucidly shows in his address to the New York Peace Society; though why he should be so keen to have armor punched full of holes when he no longer needs the fat profits from armor contracts, one does not understand.

However, we peace people of the bloodthirsty Carnegie kind are not a majority of all of us, the people of the United States; and the majority believe that there should be some little naval preparation as an insurance against war.

The statement of this fact brings us around to the contemplation of the matter I was to advocate after "The Abolition of the Navy at the Earliest Practicable Date,"—the "Meanwhile Maintenance of the Littlest Navy We Can Afford."

In deciding on how small a navy we can get on with, and with it prevent incipient wars, it may be well to glance at our rather curious position in the family of nations of the world as a factor in bringing on or preventing wars; also, to glance at the enormous war expenses we could have saved by a little judicious expenditure in naval prevention of war, and then to consider, in passing, whether or not we are a right-and-honor-yielding, arbitrating, peace-at-any-price kind of people that don't need any war prevention.

In ancient times, there was no family of nations, because there were no nations. There were peoples and city-states, but no nations, none of the combinations of a people and its country—its land—that we know as a nation. As there were no nations, there could be no understanding between nations as to rights and duties toward each other,—no international law.

After Rome overran the world, she found it necessary to arrange a code of laws that would apply to all kinds of foreigners, and produced the *Jus Gentium*,—a wonderful code for application to foreign and domestic individuals, but having absolutely no application to foreign nations, since there were none, since the one big city state of Rome ruled all the world.

After the fall of Rome, the welding together of the occupying peoples and the countries occupied into what we know as nations gradually went on, with the consequent growth of questions as to national rights and duties, until, in time, that most remarkable man, Grotius, conceived, developed, and, after many delays, got adopted a code defining national relations,—a code of International Law,—and the family of nations was formed.

After Cornwallis surrendered, because the British Fleet was hampered in the West Indies by foolish prize laws and because therefore the French Fleet arrived in the Chesapeake and so prevented the continuance of the Revolutionary War, our nation, the young United States of America, entered the family of nations and accepted the common code of International Law.

We accepted it for a little more than forty years; and then we made modifications in the common code in



regard to all matters affecting territorial occupation anywhere in the Western Hemisphere,—modifications which have been regularly accepted by only one or two European nations, but have always been adhered to by us.

This Monroe Doctrine, which, according to Hannis Taylor,—probably the best living authority upon its origin,—was proposed by Canning, the great British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and afterward Prime Minister, formulated by Jefferson, then ex-President, and proclaimed by President Monroe,—this Monroe Doctrine came into existence because the proposal of the Holy Alliance to conquer the young Spanish-American Republics and return them as colonies to Spain, from whom they had successfully revolted, ran counter to British ocean-carrying trade interests, and incidentally because that proposal ran counter to our preference for Spanish-American Republics to Monarchial Spanish-American Colonies as neighbors to the southward. Great Britain proposed that we should pull her chestnuts out of the fire; and we were very glad to accommodate her, for reasons of our own.

Our stand against the Holy Alliance was a very plucky move by our young and navy-less nation; it would have been far more plucky and far less rational had we taken the stand we did without knowing that we held under our lee the only things that could save our national honor if our bluff were called,—every ship and every man in the British Navy.

Well, in its ninety years of life, the Monroe Doctrine has grown from an expression to Europe of "Hands off of Spanish-American territory." to a clear intimation that European nations are not to interfere, as we may and do, in the affairs of Latin-American Republics, and that in the Western Hemisphere our interests are paramount.

Judging from the recent insistent demands for armed protection to American property abroad and from the expression of our public opinion upon those demands, as voiced by the press of our country, the Monroe Doctrine seems to have come to mean this:—

Foreign-owned property located within the limits of the United States is American property; American-owned property located within the limits of Latin-American nations is American property also, and must be given the same protection as would be due it were it located within the limits of the United States, but must remain free from any direction whatever either by the United States or by the unhappy Latin-American nation within whose limits the property may be located, especially if, as is so often the case, the title to such American prop-

erty lies in a fraudulent or violated government concession.

For this Doctrine, although its limits and applications are rather vague to most of us, all of us American citizens are ready to fight at the drop of the hat—and especially so ready while arranging to provide ourselves with little or nothing to fight with. We were ready, quite ready, to fight for the Monroe Doctrine in 1865, when it had been disregarded in Mexico by certain European nations while we were more or less preoccupied by internal disturbances. We were ready then to enter upon an expensive war in defence of the Doctrine, and we had things to fight with.

And we were just as ready to fight for it in Venezuela in Cleveland's time, when we had nothing to fight with, and to fight for it with the nation that had backed us in our original assertion of the Doctrine. The Lord in his infinite goodness and mercy, working through the vehicle of the common sense of the British public, since He could find none of that useful commodity in our public, saved us from the frightful calamity that threatened. Moreover, there was then established a precedent supporting, more definitely than ever before, the principle that our interests are paramount in the Western Hemisphere.

But the real dangers of war through the assertion by us of an International Law proposition that is not generally acknowledged as sound in the family of nations, are rarely publicly known.

There was a case of this kind.

A powerful European nation desired a foothold on the coast of a Latin-American country for a coaling and trade station, and the Latin-American government concerned wished to pay off certain claims and indebtedness by the cession of the necessary territory. We invoked the Monroe Doctrine, and were informed that it did not fit the case at all; that the proposed trade between the two agreeing nations had no relation to the matter of reconquering revolted Spanish colonies; that one of the agreeing nations never had and never would recognize any weight in the Monroe Doctrine; and, in short, that the matter of the coaling station was none of our business. We thought it was; and fortunately, at that time, we happened to have just enough naval strength—nor any ton or gun to spare—to allow us to go on thinking that way, without having our thinks very sadly jolted.

The fact that we are most curiously situated in regard to our out-lying dependencies in the Pacific and in the Caribbean has a direct bearing upon our relations in the family of nations. While we have rather fixed ideas as



to what we mean to do with our continental territory, which now stretches farther west of San Francisco than San Francisco is West of Boston, we have never really attempted to tell ourselves what we meant to do with or about our over-sea dependencies. Some fifteen years ago they happened to come to us — and we have let 'em happen ever since.

A couple of years before the Spanish War, my work consisted in making up schemes of war, in putting into form methods for using what naval personnel and material we had to the best advantage in case of war. In collecting the necessary intelligence, I saw, of course, that war with Spain was unavoidable, when there was taken into consideration the conditions of the two navies and the kind of people the Spaniards were — and the kind of people we were. Naturally also, I saw that we must again expand our territories, as we had been doing more or less frequently ever since we were born as a nation, and as any healthy nation situated as ours is must continue to do till it gets ready to die as a nation, whether we the people like or dislike expansion.

I did not at all like the contemplation of our expanding over seas and acquiring a conglomerate mass of dusky peoples to make over into American citizens, or American subjects, or American dependents; but I was then, so to speak, mentally young and fair, with long mental flaxen curls, and I said to myself: Ah! when the dependencies come to us, when therefore conditions arise which could not have been and were not contemplated when the constitution was framed, then we, the great, altruistic, adaptable American people, will quickly adapt ourselves to the limiting conditions of our new environment; we will tell ourselves and the peoples of the dependencies what we mean to do for the benefit of all concerned; and, since we live under a written Constitution, we will, in general terms, formulate our intentions in an amendment to that Constitution for our own guidance and for that of the peoples of the dependencies, so that every one may know what to expect, and all live happy ever after.

I am older and sadder now. I don't think those things any more.

But the one sure thing about those dependencies now is, that other nations want 'em; and, whether we think we want to hold them or lose them, we would fight for them to the limit — if any other nation questioned our control. The question of outlying dependencies seems to be rather an important item in the schedule of matters to be considered when settling upon the amount of insurance against war that we need in our national business.

Then there's the Panama Canal. We are very proud

of, and altruistic about, that canal. We intend to benefit the whole world with that canal, and, as a matter of fact, are proceeding in such a way that all the world will benefit by it more than ourselves. However, that's another story.

Some of us wish to neutralize it; some of us wish to hold it by force, some of us wish to maintain it by certain kinds of toll, and others by other kinds of toll; but all of us mean that it shall continue to be our canal that we built with our money, and all of us would go into the most expensive of wars to retain its possession and control.

There are plenty of nations who just could not help taking over the control of the canal when we did not manage it in the right way; and by no possible chance could we ever manage it in the right way from the viewpoint of a nation that wished the control, — unless we kindly aided them to not take it by putting a little insurance against war risks upon that canal property of ours.

Now, a brief, very brief, glance at the frightful wastes we have committed through our national — habit, — I was about to say policy, when it occurred to me that we the people never have had and have not now anything remotely resembling a naval policy, — through our national habit of maintaining a littler navy than the littlest we could afford.

If, during the Revolution, we had properly backed Paul Jones and furnished him with a half dozen small frigates — which we could then afford — for continuing his raids on the British coasts, and had given Barry a like number for work on our home coast and in the West Indies, we could have induced the coming of the French fleet in time to have prevented the continuance of the war during its last two years and the corresponding expense to us.

Then, in spite of Washington's warning, we abolished the navy, not as I am now advocating, at the earliest practicable date, but at an earlier and impracticable date, as was apparent when the French War of Reprisal came on and the French men-of-war captured a large proportion of our utterly unprotected merchant-marine. So we built a few frigates and prevented any further war loss, none of which would have been suffered by us had we kept up what little and inexpensive naval insurance against war we had at the beginning of Washington's first administration.

Because the expenses of the government were mounting up, and because then, as now, the idea of cutting down on naval prevention of war was popular, we again, after the war with France, practically abolished the navy,



and again suffered in pocket and in national dignity through being forced to pay, under the most humiliating conditions, large sums of money to the Barbary Coast pirates; until, at far greater expense than would have been necessary in subduing these pirates had we kept up our naval insurance against just such risks, we rehabilitated what navy we had, and Preble promptly stopped all Barbary-pirate expenses.

The war of 1812 was brought on simply and solely because we insisted upon maintaining a littler navy than the littlest we could afford.

The littlest navy we could then afford was one just big enough to furnish some obstacle to British insults to our flag afloat. We did not maintain it, because Jefferson's notion that we could not be a maritime people on our own coasts and could never acquire what no real nation with a sea frontier can exist without—sea power—was accepted as wisdom by many of our people. Many of us have much the same kind of notions to-day, or we would not so meekly pay tribute to nations that appreciate sea power and annex our ocean-carrying trade.

The result of Jefferson's policy was that we had to pay the expense of the war of 1812, and to suffer the humiliation of seeing our ships driven from the ocean, our coast ravaged, our capital burned, and ourselves glad to make peace without even mentioning, in the treaty, the principle we declared war to sustain.

In the Mexican war, there was comparatively little waste due to our lack of naval prevention of war, because our adversaries, the Mexicans, had none at all. The continuance of the war was properly prevented by the navy's promptly putting Scott's army safely ashore below Vera Cruz for the hike to Mexico City and the ending of the war.

At least seventy-five per cent of the enormous expenses of the Civil War—expenses we are still paying in pensions, national debts, etc.—was a preventable waste we made through maintaining a littler navy than we could afford. With a navy little, but large enough for use in holding all the Confederate ports and reinforcing all the United States fortified posts along the coast, the war could not have continued a year.

Had we possessed seven more ships than we did in 1896,—four more battleships and three more cruisers of designs of that date, the unavoidable war with Spain would have been avoided and with it the enormous expenses of raising troops and pensioning them afterward.

Yes; we the people have wasted many and many a billion of hard-earned and God-given dollars by failing to provide proper prevention of war.

We Peace Society folk are quite sure that there is no need of preventing war, because no one would ever wish to be so disagreeable as to attack us; because we are too polite to attack any one; and because we abhor war, beside.

The difficulty in maintaining this position, otherwise than by bald assertion,—the favorite argument among us Peace Society people,—lies in its curious lack of precedent.

In the 137 years of our national life, we, the war abhorers, have been fighting somebody or other one year for every five years we have been at peace, not to mention warring with Indians and shooting each other, more or less, all along between times; and as for our being too polite to ever attack—well, we attacked the colonial institutions of Great Britain rather effectively in the Revolutionary War; we attacked France for interfering with our shipping; we attacked and brought to reason the Barbary pirates. In 1812, we declared war against Great Britain, attacked her, and tried to invade her territory and capture it. We did not succeed very well, to be sure, but we attacked all the same. We attacked Mexico in 1848, invaded, captured, and held her territory. In 1861, we attacked the Confederacy and captured and held its territory; and in 1898 we attacked Spain, invaded, captured, and held her territory.

We could not possibly maintain the Monroe Doctrine by force without attacking some one. In Cleveland's time, we were quite ready to maintain it by attacking Great Britain, when we had, practically, nothing under Heaven to attack with.

As to no nation's ever attacking us: no nation ever will until we make it comfortable and easy to attain a part of our wealth or trade or territory by removing preventatives to such attacks; then almost any nation will attack. Attacks will come in rapid succession, when we make them profitable to the attackers.

We are such a very warlike, most un-military, wonderfully inconsistent people,—a people which, when I was in active service, before I retired and became so much of a civilian, was considered by the whole personnel of the service forward and aft to be that people of all the world the best worth living for, dying for, fighting for, freezing for, searching for, and having a tussle with Yellow Jack for,—such a people for shirking our duties as citizens that we decline to define the size of the littlest navy we can afford.

We decline to consider whether those are nearer right who declare that one battleship is too many, or those who assert that one hundred super-Dreadnoughts are too few, and so fiddle faddle about with one ship this year



and two or more next, without any real reason for spending money as we do.

There are no advisers to advise us, barring navy men, and we throw out their suggestions as prejudiced.

It has been proposed to establish a National Council of Defense made up of Senators, Representatives, Cabinet Officers, and two army and two navy men, to consider the matter of the most economic prevention of war possible for us and then to inform us as to what the Council has to suggest.

But we, the people, take less than no interest at all in this Council of Defense notion and will have none of it, because we are an extravagant lot and always prefer to affect that kind of economy which is the worst kind of extravagance,—the providing of preventatives of war too little to prevent, the paying of insurance too little to insure.

But, in our secret souls, we, all of us, really know just how little is the littlest navy we can logically afford.

When we take into consideration the kind of self-asserting, war making, arbitration-rejecting people we are; the peculiar position and the peculiar responsibilities of our nation in the family of nations; the enormous wealth and resources of our country, which are bound to assert themselves in ways disagreeable to other countries,—when we consider these things and don't try to shirk our obligations as patriotic American citizens, we know that, on a purely business, dollars-and-cents economy basis, the littlest navy we can logically afford and toward which we would now slowly, regularly, methodically, and in a business-like way be working, if we had any national business sense,—yes, we all know perfectly well that that littlest navy we can logically afford, is and must eventually be a little bigger than any other navy.

Perhaps, because of my false similes, bad logic, incorrect parenthetical injections, split infinitives, involved diction and other high crimes against the English language, you are a bit doubtful of my meaning. If so, it does not matter in the least.

But if the salient facts and indisputable truths floating about in the quagmire of my talk have caught your attention sufficiently to induce you to consider what ought to be done in view of the conditions, existing simply and solely because of those facts and truths — Ah! that matters a very great deal.

What I mean is of less importance than nothing at all.

What you, a representative body of American business men, might mean, might be of the utmost importance in laying out the course to be steered while heading for our best, safest, and most natural national development.

## FOREIGN NAVAL CORRESPONDENCE

(*Special Correspondence of THE NAVY*)

### LETTER FROM LONDON

#### *The "Understanding" With Germany*

A species of "understanding" with Germany is supposed to be in process of being arrived at. The German Minister of Marine has stated that Germany is prepared to accept Mr. Churchill's ratio of sixteen British ships to ten German. As a matter of fact, however, Mr. Churchill's original figures were seventeen to ten, though the number actually to be provided for is nearer fourteen to ten. It is not known whether the ratio accepted by Germany is intended to cover the entire British Navy or only such part of it as is in the North Sea — which naturally makes a considerable difference.

Germany's explanation is that it is necessary for her to make immense increases in her army, and that she can no longer afford to burn the candle at both ends in the matter of naval and military expenditure. It is generally considered in England that the gift to the Imperial Navy of a battleship from the Federated Malay States, with the offer of three more Dreadnoughts from Canada, has something to do with the German change of front. The Little Navyites, of course, have already begun to clamor for a reduction in the British naval program. The attitude of the British Navy League is perhaps best summed up in "Trust in Germany, but keep your powder dry."

#### *The Secrecy Craze*

The Admiralty have recently issued notices to pleasure steamers, etc., to the effect that to photograph or sketch any fort, dockyard, or warship without permission from the Admiralty, is an offence against the Official Secrets Act and that they will not hesitate to proceed against any offender. Exactly what this means is somewhat of a puzzle. Where forts are concerned, there may be some reason for the order; but penalizing the amateur who with a cheap kodak takes snapshots of warships seems to have an element of absurdity in it. However, from the way in which the order has been issued, it appears to be the duty of officers in any pleasure steamer to arrest any excursionist seen operating a kodak near a warship.

On the occasion of the *New Zealand* starting on her world-cruise, submarine *E-4* was brought alongside for inspection by the King. A cordon of picket-boats was formed round the submarine and no private boats allowed to get within photographing distance.



Yet another spasm of the same secrecy craze appears in the latest issue of the Navy List. In this, although everybody knows the facts, the displacement, horsepower, and total numbers of guns of recently completed ships are carefully omitted.

#### *Nelson Relics*

Nelson's Official Letter Book for the period from February 20 to October 22, 1801, has just been unearthed in London. It contains copies of service letters written and orders issued by him.

The period referred to covers, among other things, the famous bombardment of Copenhagen, and there are a number of instructions that indicate very clearly that Nelson realised the danger of the bombardment.

One passage, in the orders, of special interest runs as follows:—

Should the Swedish fleet come out, you are, without loss of time, to close with it and send notice in writing to its commander that his putting to sea cannot avoid being considered as an act of hostility, and that you have instructions to request he will immediately accompany you with his whole force and join the Commander-in-Chief of the British fleet (Nelson). Should he refuse to comply with this reasonable request, you are hereby required without hesitation to use your best endeavors to take possession of his whole fleet by a close and vigorous attack.

Another order of interest refers to the time when Napoleon was hourly expected to invade England and Nelson was in charge of the coast defences. One paragraph in this reads:—

As much of our success must depend on the cordial unanimity of every person, I strongly recommend that no little jealousy of seniority should be allowed to creep into any of our minds, but that the directions of the senior officer or the judicious plans of the junior should be adopted with the greatest cheerfulness. . . . I rely with confidence on the judgment and support of every individual under my command, and I can assure them of my readiness to represent their services in the strongest point of view to the Admiralty.

## LETTER FROM PARIS

### NAVAL AVIATION

Naval aviation is more and more engaging the attention of the various powers.

In England, the "Air Department," having at its head Captain Murray Sueter, figures, in 1913, for the first time in the Navy List. It is announced that the flying corps is to be considerably increased. Aviation stations are to be formed on the South and East coasts.

Prince Henry of Prussia, in 1912, made an appeal to the German public, which was hearkened to. The subscriptions have reached nearly nine million francs.

Continually on the watch for improvements, the German admiralty is seeking everywhere for models. In 1912, it ordered a biplane hydroplane from the American aviator, Glenn H. Curtis.

Italy, also, is engaged in experiments. The navy of that country bought, after satisfactory trials, six hydroplanes, with Venice as home port. It is announced that, in 1913, Italy will have forty-eight military hydroplanes intended for the eight naval aviation headquarters,—Venice, Ravenna, Ancona, Brindisi, Tarenta, Naples, Spezzia, and Maddalena.

In France, the hydroplanes have met with great success, even outside the navy. This vogue is due to the fact that they give more safety to the aviators than the simple "avions." The hydroplanes are less exposed to accidents in landing, and the falls in case of capsizing or sudden motor stops are less dangerous.

France organizes frequent hydroplane competitions. In the competition last August (1912), the course was from St. Malo to Jersey and return. Four apparatus went through the trial without any accident, the unfavorable weather and violent seas making the trial the more convincing. Nevertheless, this triumph of the hydroplane is far from being definitive. The St. Malo concourse has, however, shown the daring and tenacity of the aviators.

At that time, Ensign Conneau, of the French Navy, proposed to go to London from Paris by the Seine and the Thames. From Paris he went to Havre, then Boulogne. On leaving that port, his apparatus capsized. The aviator fell to the sea, but escaped injury. The damaged apparatus had to be repaired, and this delayed the trip to London.

The Fourth Aviation Exposition, opened in Paris, in November, 1912, included a number of hydroplanes. But those machines, built in Paris, did not fulfil the conditions indispensable for the naval services. They were evidently meant to alight in rivers or lakes. The Paris exposition has shown how deeply inventors are interested in the question of safety, judging from the number of safety devices exhibited.

The ocean hydroplane has yet to be found, and the solution of the problem requires the co-operation of a constructor and a sailor. It was in order to solve the question that Ensign Conneau, who has performed great feats under the name of Beaumont, engaged in the great industry. It is announced that, in the near future, there



will be a series of experiments with a hydroplane that will keep at sea better than any apparatus so far known.

Inventors were stimulated by the brilliant experiments of M. Eiffel, the engineer-builder of the tower of 300 meters in height, to which wireless telegraphy has lately lent such an unexpected importance. For some time past, M. Eiffel has been engaged in a series of experiments touching the resistance of the air. By means of blowers properly adjusted, he produces uniform currents of air whose velocity reaches up to 140 kilometers per hour. In those currents he places the surfaces to be studied, and the pressure of the wind on the surfaces are indicated by a very sensitive scale. M. Eiffel is engaged in the study of the wings of the apparatus, of the shape of the screws, and of the effect of the wind on the hangars, which are so much exposed to the blast that they are sometimes entirely demolished. The results obtained were immediately applied, and it was thus that M. Orzewiecki (author of so many inventions in torpedoes, launching tubes and submarines) solved the question of stability by the combination of two surfaces. That invention is soon to be tested.

There are two hydroplanes now under construction for the French navy. One, with seats for two, has a spread of wings of eleven meters and will fly at the rate of 40 kilometers an hour, with a radius of action of one thousand meters. The other, also with double seat, will travel at the rate of 130 kilometers. No time is to be lost in increasing the number of apparatus; for the navy general staff has just worked out a plan of organization, the main features of which are: in the western Mediterranean basin, a certain number of strategical points in France, Tunisia, and Algeria. Those various points have dirigibles with a capacity of 20,000 cubic meters, with a considerable reserve for ammunition. On the Atlantic, there will be one base for dirigibles and two for hydroplanes. As is well known, great improvements have taken place in kites, since Engineer Hargrove of Australia has brought out the cellular kite.

Twenty-seven million francs have been provided for expenditure, in four installments, 1913, 1914, 1915, and 1916.

The Aero Club of France is about to do justice to one of the pioneers of aviation, by raising a monument to Wilbur Wright. Four years ago, December 31, 1912, the American aviator flew 124.7 kilometers in two hours, 20 minutes, 23 seconds. It is only right that his disciples and their followers should preserve affectionately the memory of that predecessor.

D.

## LETTER FROM CHINA

*January 18, 1913.*

The spirit of war is abroad in this great land, and many are the patriots who demand with misguided fervor and vehemence that the government at once drive the Russian Bear from his lately acquired stronghold in Mongolia. Some of the militants even talk of ridding this continent of the unfriendly northern neighbor. The other day, Sun Yat Sen, the great leader in the revolution and first President of the Republic, in a 3000-word telegram, advised the central government in Peking to organize an army of five million men and send it on a campaign of invasion to Russia in Europe. This wild thought is quite on a par with the suggestions of many other flighty patriots. Indeed, there has been so much loose talk that one wonders whether, after all, there is any real statesmanship in the country, or anyone to handle the affairs of the nation.

The saving feature of the situation is the calm, dispassionate attitude of Yuan Shih-kai. This man, who is a statesman and who knows the game of Chinese politics better than anyone else, is gradually strengthening his hold on the nation, and in him lies the only hope, as far as one can see, of salvation for China. China is lucky to have a man of President Yuan's strength and character. There are, however, many politicians, mostly disappointed office-seekers, who secretly conspire against Yuan Shih-kai and would be well pleased if China went through another upheaval that would result in the disappearance of Yuan Shih-kai from Chinese public life, or from the earth, for that matter.

While most of the war-talk is on the same flimsy, visionary basis as that of Dr. Sun, with little of common-sense of realization of obvious facts, the agitation is not without its benefits in the direction of solidifying the diverse interests of the various provinces. The control of the central government over the outlying provinces and dependencies — control which Yuan Shih-kai has not entirely established — is the most essential thing to the continuance of the present Republic. The relations of the provinces and the central government is not dissimilar to our own old question of States' Rights; and here, as in America, the problem is saturated with possible troubles. The local authorities, after the fashion of Chinese politicians, desire to run their own provincial affairs, particularly that part of administration having to do with the collection of revenue; while the government insists that the provinces should be administered from Peking.





AT HANKOW: REBEL 3-INCH GUN

The war-scare proves a valuable weapon for Yuan Shih-kai in his struggle to place the authority of Peking over the provinces, and one which, it is to be suspected, he is using with full effect, going even to the extent of stirring up the nation by encouraging such talk of conflict.

From Yunnan come reports of the organization of a society for the purpose of preserving the nation. In the old days Yunnan, away off to the south, would not have given a thought to the disappearance of Mongolia from the Chinese map. Now, however, the Yunnanese prove passionately indignant and are fully prepared, in their eloquence at least, to send an army to the north.

In and around Canton, where the patriots and principal officeholders come from, troops have been drilled for the forthcoming struggle with Russia; and — what is highly important — a war fund is being raised. Of course the fund will never be utilized, nor, in all probability, will it ever be returned to the subscribers.

In Szechuen, a hotbed of revolution in 1911, the war spirit has taken a firm hold and a division of troops has been offered to the central government.

Other parts of the country are aroused in similar fashion. Nothing will come of it at this time, of course, and Yuan Shih-kai, at the instance of the Russian Minister, issues edicts deprecating the fiery discussion; but, at the same time, the country has been aroused to a sense of nationalism, and to the fact that foreign aggression is being actually carried on. In one sense, that of the increase in national spirit, the agitation has not been a bad thing; in fact, in the end, it will prove highly beneficial. At the same time, the Russian seizure of Mongolia gives the enemies of the Peking Government

an opportunity to injure Yuan Shih-kai by charges of dilatoriness and inefficiency in not resisting the Russian.

The greatest question of all, however, is whether China will ever become the strong military nation it will have to be if Mongolia and Manchuria are to be recovered. There are many Chinese statesmen and patriots — there are such things here, although they seldom find their way into public office — too wise to believe that anything can be done at this time; but, at the same time, they entertain the earnest hope that China will become, some day, a military nation, — a country with enough soldiers to right all wrongs of the past, of which there are more than a few. The glowing example of Japan, even though China suffered and suffers by the advance of that nation, is taken to show what a nation can do.

Whether the Chinese are fundamentally capable of assimilating modern military training to an extent that will enable them to drive out aggressors is one of the greatest questions of the age. If China is ever able to defeat Russia or Japan, or both, as she might in the distant future have to do, the rest of the world will be vitally affected, and there will have to be a new balance of power arranged all around.

China has men — millions of men — who are fatalists in a way, with a certain courage in battle, — at least when fighting with men of their own race, — and with muscle and brawn that lends to great physical effort on very little food. But whether the Chinese can be made into a fighting man who could stand against a modern soldier of the West or of Japan is a thing that the future must disclose. At the moment he is incapable of doing so; but he is so much nearer the goal now than he was ten years





CHINESE SOLDIERS

ago that the question is rather imminently serious and important. He will not attain any sort of equality with the Western soldier in another ten years, or even in twenty, but he may do so in three or four decades more. Then China, if China still exists, will become a certain menace to some of her aggressive neighbors.

Some weeks ago, some fifteen thousand troops of the Chinese army, soldiers of all branches, were reviewed by Yuan Shih-kai. No one could see those hardy, strong men march past without thinking of what the future will be when these men get the training in modern military affairs and acquire the morale and spirit of a present-day fighting man. There was infantry, cavalry, and artillery, all most modern. The men marched by the reviewing stand in splendid order, despite a twist in the road a few yards away, which made it highly difficult to maintain a perfect front. They showed the result of a lot of training. Their equipment was uniform and modern, and, apparently, in excellent condition. Altogether, it was an impressive display of latent strength.

The one great lack in China's army is the true sense of discipline. Soldiering became an honorable thing only within the last few years, and the military spirit has not taken a firm hold on the country as yet. During the recent revolution it was shown that even the higher ranking officers, generals and so on, were inclined not to treat orders from Peking with too much respect, and often to do as they saw fit rather than what the government wanted done.

This spirit of insubordination, which reached its height with the influx of numbers of foreign-trained

youngsters who came back to become generals, extends into the ranks; and, as a direct result, there are dozens of looted towns and cities in various parts of the country. If a soldier's pay is delayed, as it has frequently been during this last year, he regards it as his inalienable right to loot the town in which he is stationed. It has been so for hundreds of years, and will doubtless continue to be so many years to come.

The army learned its power during the revolution. It was largely due to a combination of generals of the Imperial Army that the throne was finally abdicated, and even nowadays, with the Republic established, the military now and then sends in its threats to Peking on some score or other, and usually gets what it wants.

To become great, the Chinese army will have to be re-organized. Most of all, there is needed a moral regeneration, which will bring about a condition of real and lasting discipline. All this will take a great deal of time, probably many years, but when the changes are effected, China will become a real factor in the world, to say the least.

The possibility of a strong military China depends largely upon whether China is permitted the opportunity. There are great forces at work even now to keep China weak. Russia has seized upon Mongolia, and China has lost this vast dependency. The mere loss of far-off Mongolia does not make so much difference as does the fact that Russia has advanced down to the very borders of Inner China, and from there, at some future date, will doubtless advance still farther, unless checked by some outside power.



## FOREIGN NAVIES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### *Naval Budget*

The Revised Estimates of the Naval Budget have increased the amount to be asked for to \$271,000,000.

#### *Navy League Program*

The British Navy League is advocating a program of six new capital ships, in order to ensure without question the minimum of sixty per cent superiority over the German Fleet. In approving of this, Mr. Yerburch says:—

Our program of new construction is not making good the expressed intention of the Admiralty to maintain a sixty per cent superiority over Germany in Dreadnoughts. The League, which succeeded in wringing those extra Dreadnoughts from a hesitating and unwilling Government in 1909, must bring all the pressure it can command upon the present Government to secure the laying down of six ships this year, and the commencement of all the ships of the year's program at the earliest possible date. Our battle-cry must be, "We want six, and no tricks."

#### *New British Naval Program*

"The program of armored ships will consist of five, as previously foreshadowed. The five will be of a hybrid type, neither battleship nor battle-cruiser. They will be vessels of about 28,000 tons, with an armor belt of 13½ inches, a legend speed of 25 knots, and an armament of eight heavy guns, 16-in. or 16.25-in. The amalgamation of type has been long approaching. In these vessels we shall have arrived near the ideal of Lord Fisher's 'New Testament' ships.

"Next, there will be eight light-armored cruisers, about 300 tons heavier than those laid down last year. These will be armed with four 6-in. and eight 4-in. guns, sufficient to knock out any light cruiser yet designed by a foreign Power.

"But the most interesting change will be found in the program of torpedo craft. The destroyer is to disappear. In her place, submarine torpedo craft will be built, which will far exceed the 'E' and 'F' class in power. They will, in fact, be destroyers capable of submersion, and, therefore, available for attack both by night and day. The details are as yet a secret, but it is safe to say that these craft will have a surface speed approaching that of the 'River' class of destroyer, that they will be well armed with quick-firing guns, and will have a greater radius of action than any destroyer afloat.

"In addition to these, it is proposed to build a certain number of small submarines for the purpose of coast defence. They will be of about the size of the 'A' class,

but will embody numerous improvements in offensive power.

"The development of air-craft has not been overlooked in the plans of the Admiralty. In addition to their main armament, the new battleships will carry not only 6-in. guns, but also 3-in., disposed behind armor, and mounted in such a way that they may be available for use against attack from the sky."

—*Naval and Military Record.*

### FRANCE

#### *Naval Budget*

That increased interest in the navy is being manifested by the French Parliament is shown by the passing of the heavy naval budget of 542,000,000 francs without protests even from the socialistic benches. France seems determined to maintain its Mediterranean superiority if possible.

#### *Submarines*

During the last blockading experiments, the Toulon Submarine flotilla remained at sea continuously for sixty hours, twenty-four of which were spent below the surface.

### AUSTRIA

The scout cruiser *Novara*, which has been building since November, 1911, was launched at the Danubius Yard, Fiume, on February 15. The *Novara* is of the improved *Admiral Spaun* class. Two other vessels of the same type were launched last fall. The displacement is 3,500 tons, with turbines designed to give 25,000 indicated horse power, with a speed of 27 knots. The armament consists of nine 50-caliber 4-inch quick firing guns, two pompoms and two deck torpedo tubes.

### GERMANY

#### *Battleship S*

The German battleship *S* was launched at Wilhelms-haven, on March 1. It is said she will carry a battery of 14-inch guns and have a displacement of 25,000 tons.

#### *Accident to S-178*

The German destroyer *S-178* was rammed by the cruiser *Yorck* on March 5, while the fleet was returning from maneuvers. The commander of the *S-178* attempted to cut across the battleship line and was proceeding at full speed, but miscalculated his course. The destroyer was cut into and sixty-two out of her crew of eighty-four men were drowned. The *S-178* was one of the modern destroyers of the German Navy, displacing 636 tons.



## THE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOLSHIPS

### NEW YORK NAUTICAL SCHOOL

The movement to remove the Nautical Training School from the joint control of the City and the State of New York is thoroughly endorsed by all conversant with existing conditions. One of the principal advantages will be the admission of pupils from the whole state, instead of that privilege being limited to New York City, and the school will be removed from the influence of city politics.

The following is the bill introduced, by Senator Blauvelt, to provide for the maintenance and government of the existing school as a State, instead of a city, institution: —

Section 1. A nautical school shall be maintained at the city of New York for the purpose of giving instruction in the science and practice of navigation, seamanship, steam and electrical engineering to male pupils from the several counties of this State who shall have the qualifications of good moral character, elementary education, and physical fitness which may be required by the Board of Governors of said school.

Sec. 2. It is not the purpose of this act to duplicate the New York Nautical School, now conducted under the management of the Board of Education of the city of New York, but to perpetuate and insure the continuance of that institution and to extend its privileges to young men throughout this State who shall have the requisite qualifications and who shall apply for admission with the approval of their parents or guardian. It is, therefore, provided that in the event of the Board of Education of the city of New York deciding to discontinue the New York Nautical School and notifying the Governor of such intention and of the purpose of the city of New York to transfer to the State the present training ship and the equipment consisting of books, charts, instruments, apparatus and supplies now used by said school, the Governor shall within thirty days after the receipt of such notice appoint a Board of Governors of the New York State Nautical School, which is hereby authorized.

Sec. 3. The Board of Governors of the New York State Nautical School shall consist of nine members, to be appointed as follows: One shall be a member of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York; one shall be a member of the Maritime Association of the port of New York; one shall be a member of the Marine Society; one shall be a member of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation; one shall be a member of the Buffalo Chamber of Commerce; one shall be a member of the Albany Chamber of Commerce; one shall be a New York State member of the National Board of Steam Navigation; two shall be alumni of the New York Nautical School.

Sec. 4. Three members of the Board of Governors shall be appointed for one year; three shall be appointed for two years; and three shall be appointed for three years. At the expiration of any such terms and each year three members of the Board of Governors shall be appointed as in the first instance from among the members of the organizations named in Section 3 of this act, and for a full term of three years. In the case of a vacancy from any cause such vacancy shall be filled by the Governor for the unexpired term from among the members of the organization represented by the member whose unexpired term is to be filled.

Sec. 5. The members of the Board of Governors shall serve without pay, but they shall be allowed their actual expenses incurred in attending any regular or called meeting of the Board of Governors, or in attending the sessions of any duly appointed sub-committee of said board, for any purpose authorized by said board, which allowance shall be paid from any appropriations which may be provided for the purposes of said Nautical School.

Sec. 6. The board at its first meeting shall elect one of its members as chairman, and such chairman, under the instructions of the board, shall have the general supervision and control of the school and of all its property, and shall have the direction of its work and that of the instructors and others engaged in the school. The chairman so elected shall serve as such for one year or until his successor is elected. His successor as chairman shall be selected by a vote of the members of the board at a regular meeting thereof after one month's notice that the chairman is to be elected at such meeting. The chairman of the board, as well as the members of the board before entering upon their duties as such, respectively, shall take the oath prescribed for State officers by the Constitution of the State.

Sec. 7. Within two weeks after their appointment in the first instance the members of the Board of Governors of the State Nautical School shall meet in the office of the Department of Education in the city of Albany upon a notice calling such meeting issued by the State Superintendent of Education. The Board of Governors shall provide and maintain a nautical training school pursuant to the provisions of this act, aboard a proper vessel which shall be stationed at the port of New York; they shall purchase and provide the necessary books, charts, instruments, apparatus and supplies required in the work of the school and for the proper accommodation and keep of the superintendent, instructors and pupils aboard such vessel; they shall appoint and remove the superintendent, who shall also be the commander, instructors and the necessary employees; determine their number, duties and compensation; fix the terms and conditions upon which pupils shall be received and instructed in the school and be graduated, discharged or suspended; they shall establish all rules and regulations necessary for the proper management of the school and from time to time shall arrange for cruises from and to the harbor of New York. Provided that admission as a pupil, tuition, and keep shall be free on board such vessel to any male resident of the State of New York having the required qualifications prescribed by the Board of Governors, excepting an initial fee of fifty dollars (\$50) for part cost of uniforms, equipment, etc.

Sec. 8. The Board of Governors of the State Nautical School may take over for the purposes of the school the United States ship *Newport* when the Governor shall have been notified by the Board of Education of the city of New York of its purpose to discontinue the New York Nautical School, or the said Board of Governors may apply for and receive from the United States Government or any other source any more suitable vessel or vessels as conditions may require and the Secretary of the Navy may detail. They may annually expend for the purposes of such school any sum which the Legislature may appropriate, and shall annually submit a budget or estimate of the sum required for the maintenance of the school and for its cruises. They shall keep full and detailed account [etc.] . . .

Sec. 9. The sum of one hundred thousand dollars (\$100,000),



or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated from moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the expenses of the New York Nautical School for the first year; said appropriation to become available when the Governor shall have appointed the Board of Governors as provided in this act.

Sec. 10. This act shall take effect immediately.

### PENNSYLVANIA NAUTICAL SCHOOL

A bomb-shell in the form of a resolution calling for the restoration of the *Adams* to the Navy Department, and the abandonment of the School, was recently thrown into the Board Meeting of the Pennsylvania Nautical School, by Mr. Jos. C. Gabriel, one of the Directors appointed by Philadelphia's "Reform Mayor," Rudolph Blankenburg.

We of the Alumni Association cannot bring ourselves to believe that Mr. Gabriel was serious in his apparent desire to bring about the abolishment of an Institution which has born much good fruit during the quarter century of its existence. During some years, to be sure, results have been somewhat meagre; but, taking it all in all, results valuable to the State, the nation, and the municipality have accrued.

The writer chooses — and, he hopes, shrewdly — to take Mr. Gabriel's "resolution" as service upon the Board of Directors, "To Show Cause Why the School Should be Continued if it do not Produce Results Commensurate with the Money Expended on and about its Upkeep." During the comparatively short space of time which he has served upon the Board, Mr. Gabriel has apparently weighed the School in his balance, and (to his mind) found it wanting. As to their interpretation of the figures registered upon the dial of his scales, Mr. Gabriel's deductions may be valid upon their face only.

Be all that as it may, the Alumni Association knows that the results obtained from the School, if not all that they might have been and should have been, are at least a sufficient index of what good work can be done by it if it be brought up to its possible high standard of efficiency.

That this high standard does not at this writing exist, seems to be a patent, if lamentable, fact. But, instead of proposing the abandonment of the Institution at just the time when American merchant marine promises to spring once more into active aggressive being, and when mighty efforts, which cannot but be productive of results, are being made to place the Port of Philadelphia upon a footing equal to other great world seaports, we would suggest that Mr. Gabriel pursue the course he would adopt if he discovered a unit of the great industrial system he serves to be wanting: find out the cause, and suggest a remedy.

The creating and sustaining genius of the Pennsylvania Nautical School was Captain Charles Lawrence, of whose career and achievements we spoke in a former article. While he lived, the Institution that he fathered and in which he took pride was maintained upon a footing that left no room for adverse criticism. If, with the withdrawal of his actively superintending hand, consequent upon his illness and death, there has occurred a falling-off in the school, then the remedy for that falling-off would seem to be in the securing of a Board of Directors and managerial staff willing and able to restore the School to its full and due measure of efficiency and usefulness. If there be those upon the Board of Directors who, through weight of advancing years, pressure of outside business, or other personal reasons, feel that they cannot give to the situation the thought and care which it demands, they should ask to be relieved of the burden, which many young and strong shoulders are willing and eager to assume. We of the Alumni Association feel that, twenty-five years having passed away since the first Alumnus went out from the School, we should have at least a voice and a vote in its Direction. We even take it that the office of "Director" should seek one of our men, and that no political wire-pulling should be necessary to secure for one of "the boys" a seat in the Councils of the School.

Now, "to get down to brass tacks," what is needed to pull the Pennsylvania Nautical School out of the "slough of despond" into which it has apparently fallen is a thorough investigation and renovation.

Human nature and boy nature has not changed a whit. If the boys are not responding as they did years ago; as they did when Commander Atwater and Captain George P. Runkle were in command of the School, when there were ninety-and-nine boys to answer the call to muster, it must be because conditions within the School have changed in such a way as to negative its attractiveness to the lad.

While the *Adams* is not an absolutely ideal ship for nautical-school purposes, she is to-day, physically speaking, a more attractive vessel than any other ever possessed by the Commonwealth and municipality.

First of all, the School should be adequately financed. Then the finances should be so applied that every dollar brings one hundred cents' worth of results. The School has been, should be, and can be made intensely attractive to our romance-loving "boy" population: if it be not so at this time, there is something wrong with the management, and the plain duty of someone is to find out that "something" and correct it.

Malcolm B. Webster. •



### MASSACHUSETTS NAUTICAL SCHOOL

A recent legislative act, doing away with the word "training" in the title of this school, not only discontinues the use of a superfluous and possibly misleading word, but brings about uniformity of nomenclature for the three nautical schools of New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. The new name more clearly indicates that the purpose of the Commonwealth in maintaining its nautical school is not merely to train lads to be seamen and firemen, but also to educate them to become officers of our merchant marine.

Several of the older members of the classes of 1911, having reached the age of twenty-one, are already officers. Unfortunately others, who are equally well-equipped and who have fulfilled the sea-service requirement of the law, must mark time afloat or ashore for another year or two, because they entered at sixteen years of age instead of eighteen. While a British schoolship lad may obtain a mate's license at seventeen, his American cousin must wait until he is twenty-one. This legal handicap, which prevents a qualified American youth from offering his services as an officer in the open market of the sea, is unjust. No one contends that a Naval Academy lad, if he is bright enough to graduate at twenty, should not be made an ensign with a commission in the United States Navy. His excellent technical education takes four years; but he has no more sea-service and less practical training than the schoolship boy who enters at sixteen, graduates at eighteen, and now has to wait two useless years after his "service" is in at nineteen, before he can be examined by the United States authorities for his mate's license.

Our forecastles are crowded with low-grade foreigners, and we should not compel our boys who mean to follow the sea to associate with such hopelessly ignorant and unambitious material any longer than is absolutely necessary. Furthermore, it is an old belief, and worthy of consideration, since Nelson and Farragut began their nautical careers as mere children, that an early start at sea is an asset. If the greatest shipping nation of the world permits her youth to become officers at seventeen, it surely would not be radical for us to enable our schoolship graduates to assume similar responsibilities at nineteen.

Strange as it may appear, the working out of our law favors the docile and often stupid middle-aged foreigner in becoming an officer in our merchant marine, when our native sea captains would much prefer bright young Americans if there were enough of them available. Foreigners who have proven failures in the merchant marine of their own countries come here, where their records of

incompetency are unknown, and secure American licenses. Others, often little more fit, come to block the careers of our own youth, because we are "dead easy" and give better salaries. Since Japan, having sucked the Western orange, has ceased to take on foreign officers for her merchant marine, we stand alone among nations in our short-sighted policy.

Many a schoolship graduate has given up his preferred calling in disgust because he would not endure an unnecessary two years of forecastle life after he was fitted to be an officer. Employment in our merchant marine is entirely competitive and dependent on individual fitness, because a master or chief-engineer who is not satisfied with a junior officer does not hesitate to replace him. Is it remarkable that a lad, confident of his proved knowledge and fitness, says: "I am ready to take out my license and become an officer, but I must wait two years. The foreigners I am thrown in with on this ship are not my kind of people, and associating with them is doing me no good. I will do something ashore until I can go to sea as an officer." Is it remarkable that, at the end of a year or two, such a lad, finding a foothold on the ladder of shore promotion, never goes to sea again unless a war causes him to go back? His sea-training has given him a marked advantage in certain lines of shore work, from banking to bridge-building, and he finds himself at home in manufacturing or wherever men are to be handled. It is fortunate that such men are the backbone of the alumni associations, for, without their support for the schools they believe in, mercantile nautical education would probably cease in this country.

Congressmen represent their electorates, most of which know nothing of the sea. They are in the main open-minded men, not only willing, but anxious, to legislate wisely, and they welcome advice in special matters of which they are ignorant, if sure that the advice is both expert and disinterested. That is why the shore graduates of the alumni associations may tip the scale for progress. The alumni associations must see to it that future graduates who are qualified may become sea officers at nineteen.

The *Ranger* is nearing the end of her winter term. On March 28 she goes to the Charlestown Navy Yard for her annual overhauling, preparatory to her summer at sea. Examinations for her new fourth class will take place at the navy yard early in April. Shortly after May 1, her cadets will assemble for a brief cruise along the New England coast, to prepare the "new guys" for an inspection sail down the Bay with their tolerant critic, the Governor of Massachusetts. The itinerary for the summer cruise has not yet been determined upon by the Commissioners.



## THE NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

*President:* GENERAL HORACE PORTER

*Treasurer:* CHARLES C. GLOVER

*Chairman Executive Committee:*  
ROBERT M. THOMPSON

*Vice-President:* HENRY H. WARD

*Counsel:* HERBERT L. SATTERLEE

*Secretary:* ARTHUR H. DADMUN  
Southern Building, Washington, D.C.

"Better to be despised for too anxious apprehensions than ruined by too confident security."—Burke.

### EIGHTH ANNUAL CONVENTION

The Eighth Annual Convention of the Navy League will be held in Washington, D. C., April 10, 11, and 12, at the New Willard Hotel. The opening Session of the Convention will be held at 3 P. M., April 10.

Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels will be the guest of honor at the League dinner, at the New Willard, on the evening of April 11.

The general theme of the Convention will be, "Wanted, A Naval Policy." Among the subjects to be discussed are: "A Council of National Defense," "Personnel Legislation," "A Naval Reserve," "The Panama Canal and Naval Strategy," "The Strategic Value of the Panama Canal to the Navy," "The Consolidation of Navy Yards in the Light of Strategy and Economy."

The subject "A General Naval Policy" will be treated by Captain John Hood, U.S.N., at the opening session, and throughout the convention this important question will be given consideration. The address on consolidation of navy yards will be delivered by Mr. Henry H. Ward, Vice-President of the League, at the morning session of April 11. Commander J. S. McKean, U.S.N., will give an illustrated lecture on "The Strategic value of the Panama Canal to the Navy."

Recent pending legislation regarding a Council of National Defense and a reformed system for the promotion of naval officers has focused popular attention on these subjects, and they will receive interesting treatment by speakers who have given much time and thought to their study.

At the banquet on the evening of the 11th, Colonel Robert M. Thompson will act as toastmaster. Among the prominent guests, besides the Secretary of the Navy, will be Vice-President Thomas R. Marshall; Hon. Lindley Garrison, Secretary of War; Hon. William C. Redfield, Secretary of Commerce; Senators Henry Cabot Lodge (of Massachusetts) and John W. Kern (of Indiana); Hon. Joshua W. Alexander; Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Admiral of the Navy George Dewey; Rear Admiral Charles H. Stockton, U.S.N., Retired, President of George Washington University; Rear Admiral W. W. Kimball, U.S.N., Retired; and Captain John H. Gibbons, U.S.N., Superintendent of the Naval Academy.

An excursion to Arlington and Fort Myer has been arranged for the afternoon of Friday, April 11. The delegates will have the pleasure of witnessing a specially arranged cavalry drill at the Fort, and of inspecting the wireless station at Arlington. They will also have an opportunity of visiting the home of General Robert E. Lee and the Arlington National Cemetery. The visitors will make the trip in chartered cars of the Washington-Virginia Railway Co., the cars leaving 12th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue at 1:45 P. M.

On the morning of April 12, the delegates will visit the Navy Yard and the Naval Gun Factory.

### COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

From all parts of the country have come and continue to come the names of prominent Americans who are petitioning Congress to pass the Bill for a Council of National Defense. Representative newspapers in every section have commented editorially in favor of the bill. Congress itself has all but approved the measure: in last summer's session the bill was reported unanimously by the House Committee on Naval Affairs and was passed by the House. Though much interest was manifested in it in the Senate, it failed to pass. In the last session, it was again reported unanimously by the House Committee, but lost its calendar place.

It is hard to conceive that there is other opposition than conservatism to the proposed bill. The bill provides a system for co-operative work among the different government departments, and its passage will lead to closer official communication between Congress and the Cabinet. The idea is not a new one, as prior to the Civil War, a plan was proposed which would have enabled Cabinet members to address Congress.

According to the bill, the President, three members of his Cabinet, eight Congressmen, two army officers and two naval officers, all of whom are brought in touch with the questions of national protection by reason of their duties, would assemble for the purpose of formulating policies for national defense. No provision of the Constitution would be violated. The only difference would be that the officials who have been suggested for membership in the Council, instead of discharging their duties in an unrelated and a disorganized



way, would devise in council the most judicious national defense policies. By this means waste of labor and misdirected effort would be avoided; a more exhaustive research into a given subject would be possible; and more far-sighted and effective policies would result. Every phase of matters pertaining to national protection would come within the province of the Council.

Over seven thousand prominent citizens have signed the petition requesting Congress to pass the Bill for a Council of National Defense. Less than a hundred have written to the League giving reasons for their disapproval of the bill and objections to the maintenance of a strong navy.

These objections group themselves under three general heads: A belief that there is no danger of unfriendly aggression; the expense of maintaining a navy; and a theory that armament is opposed to the interests of universal peace.

It may be said, however, that aggression in the case of undefended national wealth is probably as imminent at this day as it ever has been. During the last fifteen years a number of the leading European powers have been engaged in predatory conflict; and over twenty colonies have changed hands. Reliable statistics recently compiled at Harvard University indicate that wars are not becoming less frequent or less horrible.

The expense of maintaining a navy is small, when naval preparedness is considered as an insurance against war, for which insurance each American pays less than \$1.50 a year in premiums.

The fact that England, which maintains the strongest navy in the world, has had few serious wars in the last hundred years, indicates that armament does not provoke war but is conducive to peace.

One of the recent circulars issued by the Navy League reads as follows:—

**ARE PARTY PLANKS "COVENANTS WITH THE PEOPLE" THAT BIND THE PARTY OR ARE THEY BUT BAIT TO CATCH VOTES?**

**TO DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN:**

Your Baltimore platform navy plank reads:—

We approve the measure reported by the Democratic leaders in the House of Representatives for the creation of a Council of National Defense which will determine (formulate would have been a better word than determine) a definite naval programme with a view to increased efficiency and economy. The party that proclaimed and has always enforced the Monroe Doctrine and was sponsor for the new navy will continue faithfully to observe the constitutional requirements to provide and maintain an adequate and well proportioned navy sufficient to defend *American policies*, protect our citizens, and uphold the honor and dignity of the Nation.

The large majority of American citizens and newspapers hold that at least two new battleships should be

provided to keep this promise. Is not a party plank "a covenant with the people" that binds the party?

**TO REPUBLICAN CONGRESSMEN:**

Your Chicago navy plank is as follows:—

We believe in the maintenance of an adequate navy for the national defense, and we condemn the action of the Democratic House of Representatives in refusing to authorize the construction of additional ships.

This plank condemns the Democratic House for providing one instead of two new battleships, but is not this Republican plank "a covenant with the people" that binds the party to vote for more than one battleship?

**TO PROGRESSIVE CONGRESSMEN:**

The Progressive party navy plank includes the following: "We pledge ourselves to maintain for the present the policy of building two battleships a year."

Is not this party plank "a covenant with the people" that binds Progressive Congressmen to vote for two new battleships?

The country is now facing a peculiarly critical hour. A small naval policy combined with our accustomed policy of the smallest possible army is likely to result in a long, costly and bloody war. On the other hand, a proper display of force can compel peace and save many lives and untold millions of dollars. Should intervention be necessary in Mexico, let it be accompanied with a bloodless display of overwhelming force on the part of the United States, rather than the weak-kneed policy of providing as small an army and navy as we can scrape along with. What other result than a long, bloody and costly war could be expected when one realizes the effect on the minds of the Mexicans of the policy of maintaining both army and navy at a minimum strength?

**WAR NOT BECOMING LESS FREQUENT OR FEARFUL**

When fires become less frequent, *then* reduce your fire-insurance, but not till then. A historical and statistical investigation by the Department of Government of Harvard University shows that wars in these so-called civilized times have not become less frequent or fearful.

American policies, including the Monroe Doctrine, the neutrality of the Panama Canal, the Lodge Resolution regarding the coaling stations, the present situation in Mexico, and the opening of the Panama Canal, afford greater reason for maintaining a strong navy than even the great question of coast defense.

A nation that can afford to own a million automobiles, that spends in one year half a billion for candy and \$1,645,000,000 for liquor, can afford to provide for two new battleships.



# ORDERS TO OFFICERS, FEBRUARY 20 TO MARCH 20, 1913

(Names of vessels of the Navy are in italics)

A. Paym. F. H. Atkinson....Navy Yard, Phila.  
Ch. Mach. G. Auberlin.....*California*  
Surg. R. A. Bachmann.....*Delaware*  
Ens. R. O. Baush.....*Helena*  
Ens. F. R. Berg.....*Wheeling*  
Mach. J. W. Boldt.....*Galveston*  
Ch. Mach. W. W. Booth....Treatment Naval  
Hospital, New York, N. Y.  
Comdr. G. B. Bradshaw....Command *Yorktown*  
Ens. E. S. R. Brandt.....*Prairie*  
Act. A. Dent. Surg. J. L. Brown.....Guam  
Btsn. W. R. Buechner....Navy Yard, Mare Island  
Comdr. E. H. Campbell.....Home; wait orders  
Chap. W. G. Cassard.....Naval Academy  
Paym. Cl. O. F. Cato.....*Maryland*  
Carp. C. W. Chaddock.....*Delaware*  
A. Paym. D. T. Chalmers....Bu. S. and A.  
A. Surg. C. F. Charlton..Naval Hosp., New York  
Btsn. F. E. Chester.....*Olympia*  
Comdr. W. C. Cole.....*Monadnock*  
Btsn. N. E. Cook.....*Illinois*  
Lt. M. S. Corning.....*Cumberland*  
Carp. R. E. Corson.....Receiving Ship, Norfolk  
Mach. J. J. Coyle.....*Pittsburg*  
Act. A. Dent. Surg. J. W. Crandall..Training  
Station, Newport  
Lieut. K. B. Crittenden.....*Virginia*  
Comdr. W. M. Crose.....Navy Department  
Btsn. E. Crouch.....Home; wait orders  
Paym. Cl. T. A. Culhane..Receiving Ship, Boston  
Paym. Cl. D. W. Davidson.....Appt. revoked  
A. Surg. R. G. Davis.....Indian Head  
Ens. J. M. Deem.....*Castine*  
Btsn. W. DeFries....Navy Yard, Puget Sound  
Lieut. C. W. Densmore.....*Nebraska*  
Ch. Btsn. W. Derrington....Home; wait orders  
Mach. E. W. Dobie.....Home; wait orders  
Ch. Gunner S. Donely.....Treatment, Naval  
Hospital, Boston  
Pharm. S. W. Douglas.....Home; wait orders  
Paym. G. P. Dyer.....Home; wait orders  
Ens. A. S. Dysart.....*Kansas*  
Capt. C. W. Dyson..Inspector Machinery, Camden  
A. Paym. E. C. Edwards.....Bu. S. and A.  
Surg. C. F. Ely.....Tutuila, Samoa  
Lieut. J. M. Enochs.....*Colorado*  
A. Paym. J. B. Ewald.....Bu. S. and A.  
Paym. Cl. F. D. Foley.....*Intrepid*  
Ens. H. H. Forgas.....*Pampanga*  
Med. Inspr. M. F. Gates.....Command Naval  
Hospital, Mare Island  
Lieut. B. H. Green.....*Wilmington*  
Mach. R. G. Greenleaf....Home; wait orders  
Lieut. F. X. Gygan.....Bu. Steam Engr.  
Ens. O. O. Hagen.....*Yorktown*  
P. A. Surg. G. D. Hale.....*Yorktown*  
Act. A. Dent. Surg. J. D. Halleck..Receiving  
Ship, Mare Island  
Gunner J. Harder...Receiving Ship, Mare Island  
A. Paym. J. A. Harman.....Bu. S. and A.  
Act. A. Surg. F. A. Hartung.....Appt. revoked  
Lieut. J. W. Hayward.....Home; wait orders  
Btsn. E. Heilmann.....Home; wait orders  
P. A. Surg. R. G. Heiner..Nav. Sta., Guantanamo  
Gunner D. P. Henderson..Training Station,  
San Francisco  
Mach. A. Hengst.....*North Dakota*  
Ch. Btsn. M. Higgins.....Home; wait orders  
A. Surg. J. A. Hopkins..Navy Yard, New York  
Btsn. E. F. Hosmer....Navy Yard, Charleston, S.C.  
P. A. Surg. F. P. W. Hough....Asiatic Station  
Paym. Cl. T. F. Howe.....*Rhode Island*  
P. A. Surg. E. P. Huff.....*Florida*  
A. Surg. W. L. Irvine.....*Connecticut*  
Gunner G. W. Irwin.....Naval Station, Guam  
Comdr. O. P. Jackson.....*North Dakota*

Ch. Btsn. W. Jaenicke.....Home; wait orders  
Btsn. W. A. James.....*Fish Hawk*  
Lieut. B. K. Johnson.....*Denver*  
Ens. F. E. Johnson.....*California*  
P. A. Surg. L. W. Johnson..Naval Hosp., Wash.  
P. A. Paym. R. H. Johnston....Navy Yard,  
New York  
Paym. Cl. H. G. Jones...Navy Yard, Mare Island  
Lieut. M. Joyce.....*Birmingham*  
Paym. Cl. S. M. Katzer.....Appt. revoked  
P. A. Surg. J. B. Kaufman..Atlantic Res. Fleet  
Lieut. H. E. Kays.....*Maryland*  
Ch. Carp. C. J. Kerr.....*Wisconsin*  
Ens. E. G. Kittel..Treatment, Naval Hospital,  
New York  
Lieut. G. E. Lake.....Home; wait orders  
A. Paym. O. W. Leidel....Treatment, Naval  
Hospital, Mare Island  
Gunner A. Lindblad.....*North Carolina*  
Act. A. Surg. J. C. Littell..Navy Recruiting  
Sta., Salt Lake City  
Btsn. G. B. Llewellyn.....*Delaware*  
Ens. F. Loftin...Res. Torpedo Group, Annapolis  
Med. Dir. P. A. Lovering....Washington, D.C.  
A. Surg. W. C. Lyon..Naval Medical School,  
Washington  
Btsn. J. H. Macdonald.....Home; wait orders  
Btsn. T. Macklin.....Command *Oscola*  
Ens. F. G. Marsh.....*Cheyenne*  
Act. A. Dent. Surg. L. Martin..Navy Yard,  
Philadelphia  
Ch. Btsn. W. Martin.....Treatment, Naval  
Hospital, Norfolk  
A. Paym. J. H. Maynard.....Bu. S. and A.  
A. Paym. C. V. McCarty.....Tutuila, Samoa  
Lt. Comdr. E. McCauley, Jr.....*Scorpion*  
Act. A. Dent. Surg. A. F. McCreary..Training  
Station, San Francisco  
Capt. G. W. McElroy.....Naval Inspector,  
Pittsburg District  
Gunner H. McEvoy.....Treatment, Naval  
Hospital, Mare Island  
Gunner J. L. McKenna.....*Maryland*  
Btsn. T. L. McKenna.....*Wisconsin*  
Lieut. F. V. McNair.....*Chester*  
Lt. Comdr. R. W. McNeely.....*Louisiana*  
A. Paym. M. C. Merriman....Bu. S. and A.  
Paym. Cl. S. Mitchell.....*New Hampshire*  
Mach. R. G. Moody.....Home; wait orders  
Paym. C. Morris.....Navy Yard, New York  
Ch. Carp. H. T. Newman....Home; wait orders  
Ens. J. P. Norfleet.....*New Hampshire*  
Gunner J. E. Orton.....*West Virginia*  
Ens. T. A. Parker.....*Yorktown*  
Act. A. Surg. J. H. Payne..Navy Recruiting Sta.,  
Hartford  
Paym. Cl. E. W. Paynter.....Appt. revoked  
Ch. Mach. A. T. Percival.....Receiving ship,  
Mare Island  
Paym. Cl. L. Pittman.....Appt. revoked  
P. A. Surg. J. B. Pollard..Navy Recruiting Sta.,  
Atlanta  
Ens. H. H. Porter.....*Idaho*  
Ens. W. M. Quigley.....Asiatic Station  
Ch. Btsn. P. E. Radcliffe....Home; wait orders  
P. A. Surg. E. U. Reed....Home; wait orders  
Btsn. J. Reilly.....*California*  
Btsn. B. E. Rigg.....Naval Sta., Cavite  
Comdr. A. H. Robertson..Command *Charleston*  
Surg. S. S. Rodman..Navy Yard, Charleston, S.C.  
Lieut. F. F. Rogers.....Home; wait orders  
Ch. Btsn. K. Rundquist....Command *Sonoma*  
Mach. F. San Soucie....Naval Sta., Olongapo  
Chap. E. W. Scott.....*Kansas*  
Paym. Cl. F. V. Shaw.....*New Hampshire*  
Paym. Cl. C. R. Sies.....*Yorktown*

Btsn. B. F. Singles.....Home; wait orders  
Paym. G. Skipwith.....Pacific Reserve Fleet  
Ens. K. F. Smith.....*Cincinnati*  
Ens. J. S. Spore.....*Samar*  
Lieut. R. A. Spruance.....*Bainbridge*  
Paym. E. S. Stalnaker....Navy Yard, New York  
A. Surg. N. R. Sullivan.....Asiatic Station  
Capt. B. Tappan..Commandant Olongapo and  
Cavite Naval Stations  
Paym. Cl. R. M. Thompson.....*Glacier*  
Chap. T. B. Thompson....Receiving Ship, Norfolk  
Act. A. Surg. W. G. Townsend..Navy Recruit-  
ing Station, Baltimore  
Ens. H. C. Train.....*Yorktown*  
Mach. W. Twigg.....Home; wait orders  
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Upham....Navy Department  
Gunner E. Wenk.....*Indiana*  
Carp. H. V. Wetmore.....Home; wait orders  
A. Paym. S. R. White, Jr.....Bu. S. & A.  
Lieut. G. W. Whitlock.....Naval Attache,  
Buenos Aires  
P. A. Surg. G. B. Whitmore..Receiving Ship,  
Puget Sound  
Rear Amdr. A. B. Willitts.....Home  
Capt. W. F. Worthington....Inspection Eng.  
Material, Brooklyn  
Ens. C. Q. Wright, Jr.....*A-7*  
P. A. Surg. W. J. Zalesky.....Asiatic Station

## RETIREMENTS.

Rear Admiral A. Mertz.....March 7  
Rear Admiral A. B. Willitts.....March 26

## RESIGNATIONS.

Ens. F. H. Fowler.....March 11  
Lieut. J. B. Howell.....February 28

## DEATHS.

Pay Inspector H. E. Biscoe, at Washington, D.C.,  
February 20.  
Ensign W. D. Ford, at Norfolk, Virginia, March 6.  
Rear Admiral J. G. Eaton, at Assinippi, Mass.,  
March 8.  
Chief Engineer Charles H. Greenleaf, at Chelms-  
ford, Mass., March 15.

## MARINE CORPS

2d Lt. J. Q. Adams.....*Tennessee*  
2d Lt. M. S. Berry...Marine Officers' School,  
Norfolk  
2d Lt. S. P. Budd.....Barracks, Puget Sound  
1st Lt. P. A. Capron.....Barracks, Norfolk  
Lt. Col. B. H. Fuller.....Washington, D.C.  
2d Lt. R. S. Geiger.....Mare Island  
Capt. J. McE. Huey.....United States  
2d Lt. S. B. Kennedy.....Barracks, Mare Island  
2d Lt. T. M. Luby.....Barracks, Norfolk  
2d Lt. H. D. MacLachlan...Marine Officers'  
School, Norfolk  
Capt. D. C. McDougal.....Washington, D.C.  
2d Lt. A. B. Miller.....Barracks, Boston  
Capt. W. E. Parker...Marine Barracks, Boston  
1st Lt. E. A. Perkins.....Philippines  
2d Lt. H. K. Pickett.....Marine Officers'  
School, Norfolk  
2d Lt. S. N. Raynor.....Philippines  
2d Lt. D. B. Roben.....Barracks, Norfolk  
Major J. H. Russell.....United States  
2d Lt. J. B. Seebree.....Barracks, Norfolk  
2d Lt. A. E. Simon.....*Montana*  
Capt. W. M. Small.....*Montana*  
2d Lt. V. E. Stack.....Barracks, Norfolk  
2d Lt. A. H. Turner..Marine Officers' School,  
Norfolk  
Capt. T. C. Turner.....Barracks, Mare Island